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Notes
STATE REGULATION OF SECURITIES ISSUED IN
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS:
A CLOUD IN THE BLUE SKY
In spite of the comprehensive investor protection goals of state
securities laws, securities issued in the course of corporate reorgani-
zations are either exempted or excluded from registration require-
ments in most states. The author analyzes the absence of blue sky
law coverage in this area in the light of the traditional rationales
offered to justify the exemptions or exclusions, the federal approach
to the problem as expressed in SEC rule 145, and the alternatives
adopted or proposed in several selected states. The author con-
cludes that reorganization-issued securities must be subjected to
registration and critical review by state blue sky administrators in
order to assure an adequate level of investor protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE isSUANCE of securities in corporate reorganizations pre-
sents much the same need for investor protection as do dis-
tributions of securities for cash. Nevertheless, most state securities
acts exempt from their registration provisions, or exclude from all
their provisions, securities issued in statutory mergers and consoli-
dations and in exchanges of substantially all the assets of one corpor-
ation for the securities of another.' The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has taken the position, through the promulga-
tion of rule 145,2 that these reorganization-issued securities are sub-
ject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act).3 This change in the federal law should prompt a
reassessment of the blue sky positions on securities issued in corporate
reorganizations.
Blue sky regulation of securities issued in corporate reorganiza-
1. The language of many blue sky laws, including those patterned after
the Uniform Securities Act (USA), may embrace other forms of reorganiza-
tion (most notably reclassifications), but it has been in the merger, consolida-
tion, and sale of assets contexts that the use of reorganization machinery in
the distribution of securities has raised concerns about investor protection.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145, adopted by SEC Securities Act Release No.
5316, pt. II (Oct. 6, 1972).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act].
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tions seems to have gone largely unnoticed. In comparison, federal
regulation of securities issued in statutory mergers and consolida-
tions, exchanges of assets, and other corporate reorganizations has
had what has been described as a "protean" history.4 First, the
SEC adopted a "no-sale" theory-that the exchange of securities
in certain corporate reorganizations was not a "sale" and therefore
not covered by the federal securities laws. Over the course of almost
four decades, the scope of this policy was narrowed by administra-
tive and judicial decisions. Finally, it was reversed 'by the adoption
of rule 145, which requires compliance with the disclosure provi-
sions of the Securities Act. 5 Throughout the 40-year history of the
no-sale policy, SEC and judicial treatment of securities issued in
corporate reorganizations was closely followed.6 Numerous SEC re-
4. SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTs-THE WHEAT REPORT 254-67
(1969) [hereinafter cited as WHEAT REPORT].
5. See notes 29-73 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of rule
145 and the previous problems in the practice and theory of the rule 133 "no-
sale" rationale which preceded the new rule, see Note, Business Combinations
and Registration Requirements: SEC Rule 145, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 929 (1972).
See also Finebaum, SEC Rule 145-A Change in Theology: Issuance of Se-
curities in Mergers and Acquisitions Deemed Sales, 112 TRusTS & ESTATES
16 (1973); Heyman, Implications of Rule 145 Under the Securities Act of
1933, 53 BOSTON U.L. REv. 785 (1973); Schneider & Manko, Rule 145 (pts.
1 & 2), 5, 6 REv. SEc. REG. 811, 991 (1972-1973).
6. See Cohen, Rule 133 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 14
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 162 (1959); Demmler, Developments in Federal
Regulation of Securities, 12 Bus. LAw. 470 (1957); Lacour, A Survey of
SEC Rule 133: Past, Present, and Future, 16 LOYOLA L. REV. 355 (1970);
Orrick, Registration Problems Under the Federal Securities Act-Resales Fol-
lowing Rule 133 and Exchange Transactions, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1958);
Orrick, Some Interpretive Problems Respecting the Registration Requirements
Under the Securities Act, 13 Bus. LAw. 369 (1958); Purcell, A Consideration
of the No-Sale Theory Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 BROOKLYN L
REV. 254 (1958); Sargent, A Review of the "No-Sale" Theory of Rule 133,
13 Bus. LAW. 78 (1957); Schneider, Acquisitions Under the Federal Securities
Acts-A Program for Reform, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1323 (1968); Schneider &
Kant, Uncertainty Under the Securities Act, 26 Bus. LAW. 1623 (1971);
Sommer, Mergers, Consolidations, Sales of Assets-Rule 133, 16 W. RES.
L. REv. 11 (1964); Sommer, Who's "In Control"?-S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAw.
559 (1966); Throop, In Defense of Rule 133-A Case for Administrative
Self-Restraint, 13 Bus. LAW. 389 (1958); Throop, Recent Developments with
Respect to Rule 133, 15 Bus. LAw. 119 (1959); Comment, Rule 133 and the
No-Sale Theory: Interpretation or Legislation?, 13 J. PUB. L. 520 (1964);
Note, The SECs No-Sale Rule and Exchanges of Securities Pursuant to
Voluntary Reorganization, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1237 (1954); 19 CASE W. RES. L
REv. 1148 (1968); 71 HARV. L. REv. 1570 (1958). See generally 1 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGuLATION 512-42 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as Loss].
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leases and rulings, a significant amount of case law, and a flood of
largely critical literature in the law journals kept the legal profession
constantly aware of the problems and changes in federal regulation
of these securities.
Throughout this period, blue sky treatment of reorganizations
was often ignored by the literature7 and by practitioners.8  In the
light of new rule 145, current blue sky treatment of securities issued
in these corporate reorganizations should come into question. The
central issue will ibe whether or not these securities should be re-
quired to meet the registration provisions of state securities acts and,
if so, how should this registration be given effect? While both fed-
eral and state securities acts have investor protection as their basic
goals, they generally take different, complementary approaches.
The federal securities acts focus on giving the investor full, structured
disclosure of pertinent information about the issuer, while the blue
sky laws typically afford a critical administrative review of the qual-
ity of the security before sale is permitted in the jurisdiction.9 To-
gether, the federal securities acts and -blue sky laws can provide a
fairly comprehensive scheme of investor protection. Given this in-
7. But see Cowett, Reorganizations, Consolidations, Mergers and Related
Corporate Events Under the Blue-Sky Laws (pts. 1 & 2), 13 Bus. LAw. 418,
760 (1958).
8. Several years ago, one commentator suggested why this may be the
case:
That this situation should have existed is attributable to several
factors: (1) few practitioners recognize that the blue-sky laws apply
to offerings to a very few persons, and yet frequently it is the small
or closely held corporation which is involved in these corporate
events; (2) few practitioners are willing to concede that the blue-sky
laws have general application to these corporate events; (3) those
practitioners who understand that the blue-sky laws apply to these
corporate events have been lulled into non-compliance with the state
statutes either because they hope that the "no-sale theory" will afford
some protection at the state level or because they believe that the ad-
ministrators are happy to ignore this non-compliance; and (4) most
administrators, having insufficient time or resources to fully enforce
their statutes, are happy to ignore this non-compliance-non-com-
pliance which they do not believe in most instances to be detrimental
to the investing public.
Cowett, supra note 7, at 427. At the time this observation was made, fewer
states formally exempted or excluded mergers and consolidations from the reg-
istration requirements than do now. See notes 86-87 infra and accompanying
text. See also L. Loss & E. CowETr, BLUE SKY LAw 45-46 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Loss & CowETr].
9. See notes 77-85 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the blue sky ad-
ministrator may become interested in disclosure as well, often as part of the
"fairness" determination made by the agency. See note 143 infra. See also
USA § 304(d).
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terplay between federal and blue sky activity, the system of investor
protection in the reorganization context will not be complete -until
a complementary plan of state regulation is developed to fill the cur-
rent void in blue sky law regulation.
This Note examines the rationales behind the traditional treat-
ment of reorganization securities, the historical development of the
current SEC position, and the 'blue sky law treatment of securities
issued in corporate reorganizations. It concludes with a call for
changes in the current blue sky treatment of reorganization secur-
ities.
II. SECURITIES ISSUED IN MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATIONS:
WHY REGULATE AT ALL?
Several rationales have been proffered for excepting securities
issued through reorganizations from the treatment usually afforded
securities issues. By bringing reorganization-issued securities under
the aegis of the federal Securities Act through rule 145, the SEC has
implicitly rejected those rationales. Nevertheless they retain the im-
primatur of the states and accordingly warrant an examination in
this Note.
A. The "No Volition" Rationale
The most common argument is that in most reorganizations
there is no offer or sale of securities because the shareholders re-
ceiving securities in a reorganization do not give value.10 The crux
of the argument is that the value element of an offer or a sale must
be voluntarily-surrendered consideration, and, in a reorganization
approved only when a majority or two-thirds of the shareholders so
agree, individuals do not surrender value voluntarily in the transac-
tion. It is argued that a statutory merger or consolidation is essen-
tially a corporate act which binds the shareholder and transfers his
securities by operation of law."
The absence of value provides two reasons for withholding the
protective provisions of the Securities Act. First, the definition of
sale is not met, so the statute on its face does not apply.12 Second,
10. The Securities Act defines "sale" as including "every contract of sale
or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value." The Act's def-
inition of "offer" also has a "value" element. Securities Act § 2(3), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(3) (1970). Similar definitions are found in the blue sky laws. See,
e.g., USA § 401(j)(1), (2).
11. See note 31 infra.
12. Id.
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securities regulation policy is inapplicable to a nonvolitional receipt
of securities: registration of securities is intended to help the in-
vestor select securities that are best for him by ensuring that the in-
vestor is fully informed or by prohibiting the sale of 'undesirable se-
curities. 13
This rationale has been widely criticized. 14 It has been sug-
gested that it "overlooks the substance of [the] transaction and ig-
nores the fundamental nature of the relationship between the stock-
holders and the corporation and 'between stockholders."'15 In order
to vote, each shareholder must in fact decide whether or not the pro-
posed plan of reorganization will serve his best interests. Further,
after the vote he may choose to exercise his dissenter's appraisal
rights, if available to him under state law.' 6 The dissenter's right
gives him a true choice-to retain his securities and participate in
the subsequent exchange or to accept an alternative cash payment.
This choice would be facilitated 'by the same disclosure of informa-
tion that securities regulation would require for an issuance of securi-
ties for cash. 17 Moreover, there is at least some collective volition
in the vote on a plan of reorganization. The shareholders must
band together for majority approval. While no one shareholder
can make the reorganization decision, ,the collective volition of the
majority should 'be sufficient to find a sale.'
B. The "Shareholder Knowledge and Approval" Rationale
A second rationale for exempting or excluding securities issued
in statutory mergers or consolidations is that the shareholder is in a
position to evaluate the transaction without securities law protection.
It is argued that shareholders as a group are close enough to the
operation of the business to know, or to have access to, the informa-
tion needed to make an intelligent investor choice without federal
or state securities act protection. Alternatively, the dependency of
the directors on the shareholders for retaining their directorships is
seen as providing the shareholders an indirect influence over the plan
of reorganization, since 'typically the directors are authorized to form-
13. The federal and state approaches to securities regulation are discussed
at notes 76-85 infra.
14. See note 6 supra.
15. SEC Staff Report cited in Cohen, supra note 6, at 173.
16. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr §§ 80, 81 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as MBCA].
17. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316 (Oct. 6, 1972).
18. Id.
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ulate such plans. This situation affords shareholders an added mea-
sure of self-protection, which lessens the need for governmental pro-
tection.
This rationale, however, ignores the realities of the reorganiza-
tion transaction. Most shareholders in any but a very closely held
corporation will not be privy to all the information necessary to form
an intelligent evaluation of the reorganization plan. 19 Furthermore,
only the holder of a large percentage of the stock will have the lev-
erage to force disclosure of that information by the corporations or
other principals involved in the reorganization. Moreover, the lev-
erage of the shareholders may be no substitute for the structured,
itemized disclosure requirements of the securities laws; the share-
holders may not 'be sophisticated enough to know what information
to seek or to discern corporation bias in the manner of its presenta-
tion.
The notion that shareholder election of the board of directors
and, indirectly, of management will protect the interests of the share-
holders is likewise -unrealistic. Aside from the general problem of
management control of the proxy machinery and the tendency of
shareholders to give perfunctory approval to management recom-
mendations, 20 more particular concerns may 'be present in the reor-
ganization situation. Often management and shareholders will have
totally different objectives in a proposed reorganization. For ex-
ample, management may be swayed by the offer of long-term em-
ployment contracts, consulting fees, or stock options, to the neglect
of the best interests of the shareholders, despite the fiduciary obli-
gations of management. 2 '
C. The "Mere Change in the Form of
Investment" Rationale
The third rationale for not demanding registration of securities
issued in reorganizations is that the exchange of securities involves
little more than a change in the form of the shareholders' investment.
19. Even where the shareholder has an investment representative handling
his interests, there may be substantial difficulties. See Schneider & Manko,
supra note 5, at 993.
20. See generally Clusserath, The Amended Stockholder Proposal Rule:
A Decade Later, 40 NOTRE DAmF, LAW. 13 (1964).
21. See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF CoRPoATIONS AND
OTHER BusNEss ENTERPRISES §§ 237-38 (1970). Where management is al-
ready actively involved in the acquiring corporation, an even clearer conflict
of interest is presented. Id. at 465-67.
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The implicit assumption of this rationale is that cash sales of securi-
ties should be the primary concern of the securities laws. As seen
from a broad economic perspective, the securities laws appear to be
designed to help bring about a proper allocation of new economic
resources through informed investor choice. 'In reorganizations,
where investments have already been made but are being reshuffled
among investors, no new economic resources are being allocated, so
the need for regulation is less pressing. 22
The argument that a mere change in the form of an investment
does not warrant protective regulation errs in focusing solely upon
the allocation-of-new-resources rationale for securities regulation, for
it ignores the need to help the individual investor select the securi-
ties that are best for him. In a statutory merger or consolidation,
the security holder is surrendering rights in one enterprise for new
rights in a different enterprise. The assets underlying his investment
may change considerably, so that the character of his new invest-
ment will differ from that of the old. The nature of his interest in
the surviving or constituent corporation may also be quite different;
a controlling shareholder in the acquired corporation may become a
noncontrolling shareholder in the acquiring corporation.23  Further-
more, where a widely-held, publicly-traded corporation acquires a
closely-held corporation, the shareholder of the acquired corpora-
22. See, e.g., a 1938 SEC report to Congress, which stated -that the provi-
sions of the Securities Act:
... were designed primarily to establish standards of disclosure in
new financing and its mechanics were specifically adapted to that
end. The registration and prospectus provisions of the act are not
applicable to such specialized reorganization situations as those pre-
sented where stockholders' proxies or assents are solicited in approval
of the typical merger, consolidation, or sale of assets.
SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, AcTIVITIEs,
PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTEcTIvE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES,
pt. VII, 249 (May 10, 1938), as quoted in Throop, In Defense of Rule 133-
A Case for Administrative Self-Restraint, supra note 6, at 396.
The rationale also looks for further support to the income tax laws that
give non-recognition treatment where shareholders exchange securities in cer-
tain reorganizations. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 354, 361, 368(a)
(1) (A). But the policies underlying the -tax treatment of reorganizations are
quite different from those behind the securities acts and therefore do not afford
much support for .the "mere change in form" rationale. For example, the ex-
change of securities through a tender offer may qualify for nonrecognition un-
der the tax laws (INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 354, 361, 368(a)(1)(B)), while
such exchanges are usually subject to the disclosure provisions of the Securities
Act, even though the SEC excluded other reorganization issues of securities
from the Act. Cf. 19 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1148 (1968).
23. The underwriter status of shareholders under the Securities Act is dis-
cussed at note 73 infra.
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tion receives a much more liquid asset than he had before and one
subject to the fluctuations of the trading markets. Likewise, statu-
tory protection is needed where the shareholder takes securities in a
closely-held surviving corporation. Again, the character of -his in-
vestment in the surviving corporation may be transformed. More-
over, information about his new investment may be less available
in the closely-held survivor than in the publicly-traded survivor,
since the marketplace tends to generate information about securities
with which it deals. In either case, any change in management will
also be of great import to the investor. In sum, the exchanges in-
volved in these reorganizations must 'be characterized -for purposes of
the securities laws as more than mere changes in the forms of the
shareholders' investments. The argument that an allocation of new
economic resources is of substantially more concern than a realloca-
tion of already invested resources is suspect. Reorganizations do,
in fact, involve important reallocations of financial resources. The
decision whether to reallocate at all, and to what end, should be made
with full information and with the same administrative review ac-
corded other distributions.
D. The "Existing Law is Sufficient" Rationale
A final rationale is that securities issued in mergers, consolida-
tions, and exchanges of securities -for corporate assets can be ex-
empted or excluded from provisions of the 'blue sky laws because a
large, separate 'body of federal and state statutory and judicial au-
thority is available to assure reorganization fairness and protect the
investor.24 In addition, it is argued that any further regulation would
improperly intrude on this existing body of law.
The inadequacies of this rationale are discussed later in this
Note.2 5  Briefly, it ignores the basic blue sky law approach to in-
vestor protection, which is to assure both the full disclosure to the
agency of facts surrounding the issuance and the quality of the se-
curity before it is offered to the public.26 Further, the means of en-
suring fairness outside the registration and antifraud provisions of the
securities laws sometimes pose greater hurdles to plaintiffs than rem-
edies under the securities acts. "7
24. See Draftsmen's Commentary to USA § 401(j), in Loss & Cow=-r
347.
25. See text accompanying notes 93-113 infra.
26. See text accompanying notes 76-85 infra.
27. See notes 113-15 infra and accompanying text.
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In summary, the four rationales in support of exclusion or ex-
emption of reorganization-issued securities fail to afford -investors in
this context the protection that they would receive if they purchased
new securities for cash, even though the need for protection is simi-
lar. This is not to suggest that all reorganizations present these
same concerns. For example, mergers that merely change the domi-
cile of a corporation, reorganizations undertaken only to effect a
technical restructuring of the corporation, and certain "upside down"
mergers may not require investor protection because the nature and
character of the shareholders' interests in the underlying investment
do not change in these situations.
28
28. (a) Change of Domicile: Rule 145 recognizes that Securities Act
disclosure is not needed in this situation by specifically exempting mergers or
consolidations "where the sole purpose of the transaction is to change an issu-
er's domicile." 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a)(2) (1972). See generally Schneider
& Manko, supra note 5, at 813-14. Some blue sky administrators have taken
a similar position. See, e.g., Omo SEcuRrr-ms BULL., Sept. 1973, at 4. Prob-
lems may exist where a change in domicile results in a move from a state
whose corporation statute allows, for example, preemptive rights, director in-
demnification, or cumulative voting to a state which does not have such provi-
sions in its corporation statute. See Heyman, supra note 5, at 795-97.
(b) Technical Restructuring: See, e.g., In re Penn Central Securities Litiga-
tion, 347 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified, 357 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) (no "sale" for purposes of various provisions of the federal securities
laws). The internal reorganization of a corporation into a parent holding
company with subsidiaries may also involve only a technical restructuring of
the business with no change in the underlying assets or rights of investors.
(c) "Upside Down" Merger: Where a large corporation is acquired by a
small corporation, the securities of the acquiring corporation taken by the
shareholders of the acquired corporation do not represent a substantial change
in the underlying assets for the shareholders of the acquired corporation. The
shareholders of the acquired company are invested in essentially the same as-
sets as they were before the merger. However, the shareholders of the acquir-
ing corporation will have a substantially new investment after the reorganiza-
tion. These investors deserve the protection of the Securities Act. Neither
old rule 133 nor new rule 145 drew such distinctions in the scope of their cov-
erage. See notes 31-73 infra and accompanying text. Similar considerations
are present in the sale-of-assets situation, where a large corporation sells all
or substantially all of its assets to a small corporation in exchange for securities
of the small corporation, which are in turn distributed to the shareholders of
the large corporation. The assets underlying the investment of the selling
corporation's shareholders do not change significantly, while the investment of
the purchasing company's shareholders does change. Yet the shareholders of
the purchasing company are often denied a vote on this transaction under state
corporation law; typically, a vote is allowed only for the sale of all or substan-
tially all corporate assets. See, e.g., MBCA § 79. Some judicial authority
would recast the transaction to make available a shareholder vote and/or dis-
senter's appraisal rights in this situation. The transaction is deemed -to be a
de facto merger. See Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 136 N.W.2d
1974]
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III. THE FEDERAL BACKGROUND TO BLUE SKY REGULATION
OF SECURITIES ISSUED IN CORPORATE
REORGANIZATIONS
2 9
Soon after its creation in 1934, the SEC decided that certain
corporate reorganizations were outside the scope of regulation un-
der the Securities Act of 1933. By administrative interpretation the
SEC stated -that reorganizations carried out after majority approval
by the shareholders were "no-sale" exchanges. The no-sale ration-
ale was that shareholders received securities issued in these share-
holder-vote reorganizations without exercising individual volition and
hence did not give the "value" requisite to a "sale" as defined by
'the Securities Act.3 0 The SEC maintained that there was no in-
dividual volition in these transactions because they were corporate
410 (1965); Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333,
159 A.2d 146 (Ch.), afJd per curiam, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (Sup. Ct.
1960); Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958). But see
Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (Sup. Ct.
1963); Heilbrunn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 321, 150 A.2d 755 (Sup.
Ct. 1959). There is also some statutory recognition of the need for a share-
holder vote in such circumstances. See, e.g., Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 1701.83
(Page Supp. 1970). See generally, Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders
and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALn. L. Rav. 1,
91-147 (1969); Folk, De Facto Mergers in Delaware: Hariton v. Arco Elec-
tronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. REv. 1261 (1963).
29. For more exhaustive treatments of the history and development of
SEC regulation of mergers and consolidations, focusing on rule 133 and the
"no-sale" theory, see notes 3 and 6 supra.
30. Section 2(3) of the Securities Act states that:
[tihe term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale or dis-
position of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term
"offer to sell", "offer for sale", or "offer" shall include every attempt
or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security
or interest in a security, for value.
15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(3) (1970).
The SEC "no-sale" approach to statutory mergers, consolidations and cer-
tain other corporate transactions was initially stated by the SEC in a note to
rule 5 of the instructions for the use of SEC Form E-l, a registration form
once used in business reorganizations. SEC Securities Act Release No. 493
(C) (Sept. 20, 1935). This statement of the no-sale rule was rescinded in
1947. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3211 (April 14, 1947). Nonetheless,
the SEC continued to follow the rule in practice, and in 1951 that practice
was codified in rule 133. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3420 (Aug. 2,
1951). Then, in 1959, after the rescission of the rule had been proposed and
debated, rule 133 was amended to eliminate its application to specified secon-
dary distributions following reorganizations. SEC Securities Act Release No.
4115 (July 16, 1959). The amended rule 133 remained operative until January
1, 1973, when it was replaced by rule 145. SEC Securities Act Release No.
5316 (Oct. 6, 1972).
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acts which bound the shareholders (except for dissenters' rights run-
der state law).31
This administrative interpretation conflicted -with two explicit
exemptions in the Securities Act. Section 3(a)(9) exempts securi-
ties issued in recapitalizations where no commissions are paid to
solicit the exchange; 32 the no-sale theory allowed such exchanges
without registration regardless of commissions. Similarly, the sec-
tion 3(a)(10) exemption -for exchanges of securities for securities
pursuant -to a hearing on fairness by a governmental agency or
court 33 was undermined by the no-sale rule, which gave the same
31. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra. The underlying rationale
of the no-sale rule was probably articulated most clearly in an amicus curiae
brief filed by the SEC in National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univer-
sity, 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943). The brief,
quoted in Throop, In Defense of Rule 133-A Case for Administrative Self-
Restraint, supra note 6, at 394, stated:
In ... consolidations and mergers the alteration of the stockholder's
security occurs not because he consents to an exchange, but because
the corporation by authorized corporate action converts his security
from one form to another. . . . IThere is no sale where (1) the
vote of the stockholders is effective (subject to directors' action and
other statutory requirements) as corporate action and (2) this action
binds all stockholders, assenters, dissenters, and non-voters alike (sub-
ject only to appraisal rights of dissenters). . . . [I]n such cases a
proposed corporate act is submitted to stockholders to be ac-
cepted or rejected by them as a class, in their capacity as mem-
bers of the corporate body. Even though the stockholder may
participate in the vote which results in changing his rights as
a stockholder, his action in so doing is the action of a member
of the corporation exercising his franchise, rather than the action of
a security-holder choosing to accept an offer of exchange made to
him as an individual; and obversely, the solicitation of his vote is
nothing more than a request for the exercise of his franchise as a
member of the corporation, not an offer of exchange or sale of new
securities to him as an individual. He is functioning precisely as he
would be if he were voting on a charter amendment which would,
for example, change the corporate purposes. The fact that his rights
will be changed if the consolidation or merger is effected is a mere
incident of the corporate action in which he is participating.
The SEC also early adopted the rationales focusing on the form of the invest-
ment and shareholder approval. See note 22 supra. See also Cohen, supra
note 6, at 173-75; Friedman, The Concepts of Purchase and Sale Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 14 N.Y.L.F. 608, 608-10 (1968); Lacour, supra note
6, at 366. See generally 1 Loss 512-16, 518-24.
32. Section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act exempts "[a]ny security ex-
changed by the issuer with its existing security holders exclusively where no
commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for
soliciting such exchange." 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (9) (1970).
33. Section 3(a) (10) exempts
[any security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide
outstanding securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such
exchange and partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of such
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exemption without a hearing. 34  It also ran counter to a comment
in the House Report to the effect that reorganizations without judi-
cial supervision were not exempted by section 3(a)(10) or else-
where in the Act because they possessed "all the dangers implicit
in the issuance of new securities. '35
Almost from the outset the SEC limited the scope of the no-sale
theory. 36 It denied use of the exclusion where a -unanimous vote
of security holders was required -to approve the plan of reorganiza-
tion.3 7 It also denied the exclusion where the security holders were
offered a choice of securities in the proposed exchange.38 In each
issuance and exchange are approved, after a hearing upon the fairness
of such terms and conditions at which all persons to whom it is pro-
posed to issue securities in such exchange shall have the right to ap-
pear, by any court, or by any official or agency of the United States,
or by any State or Territorial banking or insurance commission or
other governmental authority expressly authorized by law to grant
such approval.
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1970).
34. See WHEAT RFPORT, 254-55; Sargent, supra note 6, at 84-85; Sommer,
Mergers, Acquisitions, Sales of Assets-Rule 133, supra note 6, at 13-14;
Comment, Rule 133 and the No-Sale Theory: Interpretation or Legislation?,
supra note 6, at 528-29; Note, Business Combinations and Registration Re-
quirements: SEC Rule 145, supra note 5, at 933-34; SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5246 (May 2, 1972); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316
(Oct. 6, 1972). Contra, Throop, In Defense of Rule 133-A Case for Ad-
ministrative Self-Restraint, supra note 6, at 395-99.
35. This comment was made in a discussion of the exemption afforded se-
curities issued in reorganizations approved by a court or administrative agency
(Securities Act § 3(a)(10)). H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16
(1933). Professor Loss's response was classic understatement: "If this
[legislative history] does not say in so many words that mergers and the like
effectuated by 'corporate' rather than 'individual' action are covered by the stat-
ute unless specifically exempted, it does seem to squint pretty hard in that di-
rection." 1 Loss 519.
36. Early concern focused on the abuse and potential abuse under the "no-
sale" theory. The limitations imposed upon the application of the no-sale the-
ory may have been prompted by the large number of unregistered issues which
it fostered. Professor Loss has noted that the no-sale theory permitted the of-
fering of billions of unregistered securities. 1 Loss 522, citing three proposed
amendments in Hearing on a Comparative Print Showing Proposed Changes
in the Securities Act of 1933 & The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
H.R. 4344, H.R. 5065, & H.R. 5832, Bills Related to Proposed Amendments
to the Securities Act of 1933 & to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Be-
fore the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess., pts. 1-6, at 895 (1941). More recently, another commentator noted that
acquisitions rival conventional offerings as a means of issuing stock. Schneider,
supra note 6, at 1340.
37. See 1 Loss 522; Note, The SECs No-Sale Rule and Exchanges of Se-
curities Pursuant to Voluntary Reorganization, supra note 6, at 1239-40.
38. Id.
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case the SEC reasoned that individual participation was dependent
on the shareholder's own choice, not corporate action, so that the
"voluntariness" needed for a sale under the Securities Act was pres-
ent. For the same reason, the rule did not apply to tender offers,
in which the acquiring corporation made the exchange offer directly
to each individual shareholder of the target corporation.39 Finally,
the SEC curbed the no-sale theory by allowing it to exempt securities
transactions only from registration, not from the antifraud civil lia-
bility provisions of the federal securities laws. 40 When the policy
was adopted as rule 133,'41 it was restricted to the section 5 regis-
tration requirement of the Securities Act.
Finally, two judicial decisions denied the no-sale exclusion for
secondary distributions and for securities issued in a reorganization
the purpose of which- was to further disperse securities to the public.
In SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc.,42 the SEC sought an in-
junction against a secondary distribution of unregistered securities
following a sale of substantially all the assets of Converters Accept-
ance Corporation for the common stock of Micro-Moisture. Twenty-
six of the 31 shareholders of Converters received the bulk of this is-
sue of 2 million shares in a liquidating dividend and then combined
to give to another group powers of attorney to sell -the unregistered
stock to brokers and dealers. This group plus other defendants were
in actual control of Micro-Moisture. The defendants argued that
rule 133 exempted the securities from registration for the secondary
39. No shareholder vote occurs in the tender offer reorganization; there-
fore the traditional basis for invoking the no-sale rationale is missing. See
generally WHEAT REPORT 251-52. The Wheat Report found such distinctions,
which turn on the method of business combination used, untenable and sug-
gested alternative procedures to rule 133. WHEAT REPoRT 253, 267-96. See
notes 60-64 infra and accompanying text.
40. In National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Jr. University, 134 F.2d
689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943), the SEC amicus curiae
briefs drew a distinction between the broad possible scope of the no-sale theory
and a more limited no-sale rule. Under the no-sale theory, the reorganization
is deemed not to involve a "sale" within the Securities Act definition of that
term, so neither the registration nor the general antifraud provisions, which
are activated by a sale, can apply. The no-sale rule, on the other hand, ex-
cepted reorganizations with majority shareholder approval from only the regis-
tration provisions of section 5. This distinction may have gone unnoticed by
the Leland Stanford court. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 164-68.
41. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (Supp. 1952); see Securities Act Release No.
3420 (Aug. 2, 1951).
42. 148 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (prelim. inj.), 167 F. Supp. 716
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (final ini.), affd sub nom. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241
(2d Cir. 1959).
19741
162 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
distribution. Rejecting that defense, the court held rule 133 did not
apply. It added that rule 133 was inapplicable to the whole trans-
action, since ,the shareholders of the acquired corporation were in
control of the acquiring corporation and the reorganization was
merely a step in a scheme to sell the stock to the public. 43  In Great
Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd.44 and Kroy Oils, Ltd.,45 two related delisting
proceedings, the SEC likewise rejected rule 133 as a defense to sales
of unregistered securities following a reorganization. There Great
Sweet Grass and Kroy, a firm controlled by Great Sweet Grass
through interlocking directors and a management contract, entered
into a succession of corporate reorganizations and subsequently sold
to the public millions of dollars worth of securities, unsupported by
adequate corporate assets. 46 The SEC found that the defendants
had prearranged a substantial distribution of securities through the
shareholders to the public. Under the circumstances, it reasoned,
the shareholders were -underwriters, selling for an issuer in connection
with a public distribution of the securities. 47  It stated that "where
the persons negotiating an exchange, merger, or similar transaction
have sufficient control of the voting stock to make a vote of stock-
holders a mere formality, rule 133 does not apply. In such case the
transaction is not corporate action in a real sense, but rather is ac-
tion reflecting the consent of the persons in control, and conse-
quently results in a sale as to them."'48  Accordingly, not even the
first exchange of assets for stock was excluded from the definition
of sale and free of the registration requirement.40
43. 148 F. Supp. at 562; SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d at 248.
44. 37 S.E.C. 683 (1957), aff'd per curiam sub nor. Great Sweet Grass
Oils, Ltd. v. SEC, 256 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
45. 37 S.E.C. 683 (1957), petition for review withdrawn sub nom. Kroy
Oils, Ltd. v. SEC, D.C. Cir. No. 13,920 (Dec. 10, 1958).
46. For an illuminating account of the "boiler room" practices involved
in -the Great Sweet Grass scheme, see Klaw, The Great Sweet Grass Swindle,
56 FORTUNE 134-35 (Aug. 1957).
47. Section 2(11) of the Securities Act defines "underwriter" as "any
person who has purchased from an issuer with a view .to, or offers or sells
for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security .. " 15
U.S.C. § 77(b)(11) (1970).
48. 37 S.E.C. at 691.
49. These three decisions and the problems they created have been the
source of a great deal of commentary. See, e.g., 1 Loss 529-34; WHEAT RE-
PORT 262-72; Orrick, Registration Problems Under the Federal Securities Act-
Resales Following Rule 133 and Exchange Transactions, supra note 6, at 3-
15; Purcell, supra note 6, at 261-69; Schneider, supra note 6, at 1324-27;
Schneider & Kant, supra note 6, at 1625-33; Sommer, Mergers, Consolidations,
Sales of Assets-Rule 133, supra note 6, at 23-24.
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In 1959 rule 133 was amended5" to guard against public dis-
tributions under the guise of reorganizations by deeming certain
shareholder-recipients of securities to be underwriters. First, para-
graph (b) provided that parties who, pursuant to an agreement, pur-
chased the issuer's securities from the constituent corporation's share-
holders or offered or sold securities for them with a view toward
distribution would be considered to be statutory underwriters.5 1 This
change addressed the situation in Great Sweet Grass and would have
made the selling group in that case section 2(11) underwriters.
Second, paragraph (c) termed any affiliate of a constituent corpo-
ration who received the securities of an issuer with a view toward
distribution to be an underwriter. 52  These persons would not be
considered underwriters, however, if they merely sold limited quanti-
ties of securities in brokers' transactions.53 Thus, the amendments
attempted to protect the public from distributions of unregistered
securities. It did so only partially, however, for security holders of a
large number of securities who were not affiliates of a constituent
corporation could resell them without registration, provided the re-
sale was not pursuant to an arrangement for a distribution. Further-
more, this approach was often inequitable in that affiliates of ac-
quired corporations were deemed ,underwriters even though after the
reorganization they might not be affiliates of the issuer and hence
could not exact registration from the issuer.5 4
Amended rule 133 did not solve the general shortcomings of the
no-sale theory. The limited exemptions afforded 'by sections 3(a)(9)
and 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act were still undermined by the
provisions of rule 133. 55 Uncertainty as to the coverage of rule 133
continued in the case of closely-held corporations, because share-
50. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4115 (July 16, 1959).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(b) (1972).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(c) (1972).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(d), (e) (1972). See generally 1 Loss 534-39,
547-53; Sommer, Mergers, Consolidations, Sales of Assets-Rule 133, supra
note 6, at 22-34; Note, Business Combinations and Registration Requirements:
SEC Rule 145, supra note 5, at 938-42. The SEC also added new Form
S-14 and post-effective amendment requirements to simplify in certain circum-
stances the registration procedures necessary under amended rule 133. SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4115 (July 16, 1959).
54. See Sommer, Who's "In Control"?-SEC, supra note 6, at 565, 593.
The amendments to rule 133 created a number of other anomalies. See gen-
erally WHEAT REPORT 262-72; Schneider & Kant, supra note 6, at 1625-33;
Note, Business Combinations and Registration Requirements: SEC Rule 145,
supra note 5, at 941-42. Cf. 1 Loss 538-39.
55. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
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holders were uncertain who would be deemed a "controlling per-
son," and thus an underwriter, subject to restrictions on the resale
of securities received in the reorganization." Applicability of the
"negotiated transaction" doctrine of the SEC to reorganizations of
closely-held companies was not predictable, because no clear SEC
guidelines on the limits of this exception to rule 133 were devel-
oped.57 There also continued to be what have 'been described as
"disclosure gaps"' s in instances where the target corporation was
publicly held but not registered under section 12 of the Exchange
Act.59 Shareholders in companies required to register under section
12 of the Exchange Act received proxy or information statements
pursuant to the proxy rules and thus had current, reasonably com-
plete information available to them, while companies not required
to register under the Exchange Act were required 'by the general
corporation statutes of many states only to send notice of the
shareholder meeting. In addition, exemption from registration un-
der rule 133 continued to turn on the form of reorganization selected
by the parties involved. 60 A statutory merger or consolidation or an
exchange of assets for stock could be exempted from registration 'by
rule 133, whereas a voluntary exchange of stock for stock (i.e., an
acquisition by -tender offer) was said to be a "sale" requiring regis-
tration. The form of reorganization chosen could also result in in-
consistencies with respect to who was treated as an underwriter for
resales following the reorganizations. In the tender-offer situation,
the "non-controlling shareholders of the acquiring corporation who,
before the acquisition, were in control of the acquired corporation,
are generally deemed not to be underwriters and are therefore free
to resell their new securities when they wish to do so without regis-
tration. ' 61 But in a merger, consolidation, or sale of assets where
the shareholders voted on the plan of reorganization, a controlling
person of the acquired corporation who did not control the acquiring
56. WHEAT REPORT 262-66; Schneider & Kant, supra note 6, at 1625-28;
Sommer, Who's "In Control"?-SEC, supra note 6.
57. Schneider & Kant, supra note 6, at 1628-29.
58. WHEAT REPORT 267-72.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78(l) (1970).
60. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
61. WHEAT REPORT 270-71. In fact, control persons of -the acquired cor-
poration may have been deemed underwriters, at least for a period of time,
under the "selling for" language of section 2(11) of the Securities Act. See
4 Loss 2562 (Supp. 1969); Note, Prereorganization Negotiations and Securities
Act Section 5(c): A Proposed Solution to the Gunjumping Problem, 24 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 731, 751-55 (1973).
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corporation could ,become an underwriter by virtue of rule 133(c).
Though a mere non-controlling shareholder of the issuer, he could
be exposed, upon resale of his securities, to liability for fraud and for
violations of the full disclosure requirements of the Securities Act,
despite an inability to avert those violations.6 2  Problems under
rule 133 necessitated a change in SEC policy on business reorgani-
zations. A study of SEC disclosure policies released in 196963 fo-
cused attention on such a need and suggested several possible solu-
tions to problems presented by the no-sale rule.6 4 The result, after
some years of further study, comment, and debate, was the rescis-
sion of rule 133 and the adoption of rule 145 and related provis-
ions. 65
Rule 145 effects a complete reversal of rule 133. Reclassifica-
tions of securities, statutory mergers, and consolidations, and the ex-
change of assets for securities, all pursuant to a plan of reorganiza-
tion voted on or consented to by the shareholders who will receive
the securities in the exchange, are now considered sales of securi-
ties.66 Therefore, these securities must be registered under the Se-
62. Id.
63. WHEAT REPORT.
64. Id. at 273-76.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145, adopted by SEC Securities Act Release No.
5316, pt. II (Oct. 6, 1972).
66. 17 C.I.R. § 230.145(a) (1972) provides:
Transactions within this section: An "offer," "offer to sell," "of-
fer for sale," or "sale" shall be deemed to be involved, within the
meaning of section 2(3) of the Act, so far as the security holders
of a corporation or other person are concerned where pursuant to
statutory provisions of the jurisdiction under which such corpora-
tion or other person is organized, or pursuant to provisions con-
tained in its certificate of incorporation or similar controlling instrit-
ments, or otherwise, there is submitted for the vote or consent of
such security holders a plan or agreement for-
(1) Reclassifications. A reclassification of securities of
such corporation or other person, other than a stock split, reverse
stock split, or change in par value, which involves the substitu-
tion of a security for another security;
(2) Mergers or consolidations. A statutory merger or con-
solidation or similar plan of acquisition in which securities of
such corporation or other person held by such security holders
will become or be exchanged for securities of any other person,
except where the sole purpose of the transaction is to change an
issuer's domicile; or
(3) Transfers of assets. A transfer of assets of such corpo-
ration or other person, to another person in consideration of the
issuance of securities of such other person or any of its affiliates,
if:
(i) Such plan or agreement provides for dissolution of
the corporation or other person whose security holders are
voting or consenting; or
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curities Act. In addition, rule 145(c) 67 provides for registration in
the case of secondary distributions following a reorganization by as-
signing underwriter status, more liberally than amended rule 133, to
any party or affiliate of a party to a reorganization other than the
issuer. 68 A limited provision for the resale without registration un-
(ii) Such plan or agreement provides for a pro rata or
similar distribution of such securities to the security holders
voting or consenting; or
(iii) The board of directors or similar representatives
of such corporation or other person, adopts resolutions rela-
tive to subdivision (i) or (ii) of this subparagraph within
1 year after the taking of such vote or consent; or
(iv) The transfer of assets is a part of a preexisting
plan for distribution of such securities, notwithstanding sub-
division (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subparagraph.
In the first draft of the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code
project, the definitions of "sale" and "offer" specifically include the "issuance
of a security pursuant to a merger, consolidation, recapitalization, or transfer
of assets for securities." ALI oED. SEC. CODE § 293(f)(3) (Tent. Draft No.
1, April 25, 1972). In the Introductory Memorandum to this draft, Professor
Loss, Reporter for the Code, remarked:
The "no sale" theory-which enabled the Commission in its early
days to construct an extrastatutory exemption from Securities Act
registration by defining "sale" so as to exclude mergers and similar
reorganizations effected by class votes, but which the Commission has
been trying to narrow or get rid of for some years-will be gone at
long last.
Loss, Reporters Introductory Memorandum to ALI FED. SEC. CoDE at xxvi
(Tent. Draft No. 1, April 25, 1972).
67. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1972).
68. Rule 145(c) states:
Persons and parties deemed to be underwriters. For purposes of
this section any party to any transaction specified in paragraph (a)
of this section, other than the issuer, or any person who is an affili-
ate of such party at the time any such transaction is submitted for
vote or consent, who publicly offers or sells securities of the issuer
acquired in connection with any such transaction, shall be deemed to
be engaged in a distribution and therefore to be an underwriter
thereof within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. The term
"party" as used in this paragraph (c) shall mean the corporations,
business entities, or other persons, other than the issuer, whose assets
or capital structure are affected by the transactions specified in para-
graph (a) of this Section.
17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (1972).
Under rule 133(c), to be an underwriter the person transacting with the
issuer had to purchase the securities with a view toward distribution, a require-
ment which is one of the statutory standards of the section 2(11) definition.
17 C.F.R. § 230.133(c) (1972). See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying
text. Under rule 145(c), controlling persons of the acquired corporation are
given underwriter status regardless of their investment intent or the size of
their new interest in the acquiring corporation. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c)
(1972). Resales by these underwriters are allowed under the limited provi-
sions of paragraph (d). 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d) (1972). See note 69 infra.
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der the Securities Act of securities issued to such underwriters is
provided in rule 145(d).69
The registration procedure for securities issued through rule 145
reorganizations is less burdensome than the disclosure required in
nonreorganization issues.7 0  Essentially, the registrant must provide
the information that either the proxy solicitation or the information
statement provisions of section 14 of the Exchange Act require.
7 1
The use of proxy information in the registration statement and
prospectus is less burdensome -than fl registration under the Se-
curities Act. Companies subject to the proxy rules will already have
completed much of the groundwork. Companies not subject to the
proxy rules will have to prepare a new document, -but performance
of this task is less 'burdensome than the disclosure required under
sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Securities Act.
7 2
Since section 2(11) seems to require that an underwriter have a view toward
distribution, section 145(c) of the rule may be outside the scope of SEC rule-
making power.
69. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d) (1972). Rule 145(d) requires that these re-
sales comply with paragraphs (c), (e), (f), and (g) of rule 144. In brief, sales
of securities in quantities less than a limited percentage of the outstanding
shares of the class of stock may be made through unsolicited broker's transac-
tions, provided that adequate public information is extant. 17 C.F.R. §
230.144(c), (e), (f), (g) (1972). See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5306
(Sept. 26, 1972).
70. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316 (Oct. 6, 1972) streamlined and
simplified form S-14, which is used for registration of securities issued in trans-
actions covered by rule 145. This form is divided into two parts. Part I, the
prospectus-proxy statement, is the important public disclosure section of
amended Form S-14. It calls for the information required under section 14(a)
or section 14(c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), (c) (1970),
regardless of whether or not the registrant is otherwise subject to those sections
of the Exchange Act. The form of presentation of the information may also
follow that of a proxy or information statement under section 14. Additional
information must be included at the time of any resale by persons deemed to
be underwriters under paragraph (c) of rule 145, so that disclosure before the
secondary distribution is current and complete. Id. See Schneider & Manko,
supra note 5, at 820-22; Note, Business Combinations and Registration Re-
quirements: SEC Rule 145, supra note 5, at 946-48. The proxy rules relevant
to registration under rule 145 have also been amended to comply with the
rule's requirements. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-2(d), 240.14a-6, 240.15c-5 (1972).
Part II of S-14, which is not part of the prospectus, must contain, inter alia,
a statement of the interests in the corporation of any experts who prepared
or certified material for the registration statement, disclosure of indemnifica-
tion agreements for the protection of directors or officers, a list of exhibits
filed with the registration statement, and an undertaking to file updating
amendments as necessary (a provision critical to secondary distributions).
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), (c) (1970).
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(e), (f), (g) (1970). See Schneider & Manko, su-
pra note 5, at 820-22; Note, Business Combinations and Registration Require-
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In sum, rule 145 secures a basic level of information disclosure
to investors in certain corporate reorganizations where previously
none was required. It affords an opportunity for an informed vote
on the plan of reorganization and assures that any secondary offer-
ing to the public of securities previously distributed in the reorgani-
zation, made by rule 145(c) underwriters, will include a fairly com-
plete and updated prospectus.
7 3
IV. CURRENT BLUE SKY LAW TREATMENT OF SECURITIES
ISSUED IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
Almost every blue sky law speaks directly to securities issued
in mergers, consolidations, and sales of assets, usually by exempting
them from the registration provisions or by excluding them from
all the provisions of the state securities act.7 4 The blue sky trans-
action exemption resembles SEC practice under the no-sale rule.
7 5
Moreover, the SEC's no-sale theory was expressly incorporated in
the Uniform Securities Act, 76 which was the model followed by states
that adopted the definitional exclusion approach for these reorgan-
ization-issued securities. Now the SEC's adoption of rule 145 raises
the question whether the states should reconsider -this blue sky treat-
ment. Such a reconsideration must focus on current blue sky prac-
tice and policy with regard -to reorganization-issued securities.
A fundamental difference 'between state and -federal securities
regulation must be taken into account in the reassessment of state
securities law on reorganizations. The federal securities laws re-
quire, in most instances, only the disclosure of what Congress
ments: SEC Rule 145, supra note 5, at 946-48. The completed Form S-14
may not be suitable, however, for use in subsequent resales, because much of
the information in them is irrelevant once the plan of reorganization has been
approved and the transaction has taken place. It has been suggested that the
SEC establish procedures for simplifying and streamlining Form S-14 for use
in resales. Schneider & Manko, supra note 5, at 822.
73. The rule has been criticized, however. One major concern is its as-
signment of underwriter status to controlling persons of acquired corporations
in mergers, consolidations, and sales of assets, while those persons in a tender-
offer reorganization may not as readily be classified as underwriters. See notes
61-62 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the problems inherent
in rule 145, see Schneider & Manko, supra note 5, at 996-99; Note, Business
Combinations and Registration Requirements: SEC Rule 145, supra note 5,
at 948-57.
74. See notes 86-87, 93-133 infra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 113-33 infra and accompanying text.
76. See Draftsmen's Commentary to USA § 401(j), in Loss & CowETr
346-47. See also text accompanying note 93 infra.
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and the SEC believe is the information necessary for an informed in-
vestor choice in the marketplace.77  In contrast, the blue sky law
postulate is that mere disclosure of information is not enough to en-
sure adequate investor protection and that a critical administrative
review should be made into the underlying quality of a security be-
fore it can lawfully be sold within the state.78  Thus, as a condition
to approving blue sky registration, the state securities administrator
requires that the proposed issuance of securities meet certain quali-
tative, statutory standards. 79 This blue sky law philosophy has
come to be known as "state paternalism". 80  Although the resources
of state agencies are often too limited to conduct extensive evalua-
tions of securities, this approach requires substantially more than
the disclosure of information that is sufficient under the federal
law.8x
Occasionally the distinction between federal and blue sky
philosophies blurs. For example, under section 8(a) of the Se-
curities Act, the SEC may deny acceleration of effectiveness
of a registration statement pursuant to a standard of "due regard"
77. See 1 Loss 121-128, 184-186; Anderson, The Disclosure Process in
Federal Securities Regulation, 25 HASTNGs L.J. 311 (1974).
78. See 1 Loss 57-61, 121-128; Hueni, Application of Merit Requirements
in State Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1417 (1969).
79. While most blue sky laws afford some statutory basis for a critical ad-
ministrative inquiry into the quality of the security, the statutory standards and
the attendant degree of administrative discretion may vary from one jurisdic-
tion to another. Standards such as "sound business principles," "grossly unfair
terms," and "fair, just and equitable," have been said to "leave a good deal
to the administrator's imagination." Loss & CowETr 67. To help avoid the
confusion that can arise under such broad standards, the Commissioner of the
Ohio Division of Securities has established written policy guidelines with re-
gard to determinations made under its "grossly unfair terms" standard. Omo
SECURris BULL., June 1973, at 10. The Uniform Securities Act limits admin-
istrative discretion somewhat through fairly specific standards. See USA
§ 306(a). Only a few areas appear to be left open to what was the traditional
exercise of administrative discretion. See USA §§ 306(a) (2) (E), (F).
Draftsmen's Commentary to § 306(a), in Loss & CowErr 328-29. See gener-
ally Loss & CowETr 67-79 (1958).
80. See Cowett, Federal-State Relationships in Securities Regulation, 28
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 287, 293 (1960); Hayes, State "Blue Sky" and Federal
Securities Laws, 11 VAND. L. REv. 659, 660 (1958); Jennings, The Role of
the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAw & CON-
TEmp. PROB. 193, 226 (1958). See also Loss & COWETT 37.
81. While administrative evaluation of securities issues continues to be the
focus of blue sky statutes, difficulties such as inadequate budgets and personnel
and uneven enforcement probably result in less "paternalism" in most states
than the blue sky laws intended. See Loss & CowETr 37, 43-86. Notwith-
standing these difficulties, current blue sky laws completely ignore this paternal-
istic philosophy in the current treatment of securities issued in corporate reor-
ganizations. See text accompanying notes 118-23, 135, 171-72 infra.
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for "the public interest and the protection of investors. ' 82  This
standard gives the SEC the kind of discretion that is typical of blue
sky paternalism.8 3 On the other hand, the New York approach to
the registration of intrastate offerings is simply disclosure oriented,
not paternalistic, 8 4 although the attorney general is authorized to
exempt an intrastate offering if "such action is not inconsistent with
the public interest or the protection of investors,"8 5 a paternalistic
standard. Nonetheless, paternalism continues to be the hallmark
of blue sky regulation, while the disclosure approach more properly
characterizes federal regulation.
Under their respective blue sky laws, the vast majority of states
generally follow one of two approaches with regard to the registra-
tion requirements of securities issued in statutory mergers, consoli-
dations, and certain other corporate reorganizations. A significant
number of states have adopted the approach of the Uniform Securi-
ties Act (USA), which expressly excludes these reorganizations from
the definitions of "sale" and "offer". 8 6  Under this approach, both
82. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1970).
83. Another example of SEC paternalism arises under section 15A of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1970), which gives the SEC some control
over unreasonable underwriter compensation. This section requires as a pre-
requisite to registration of a national securities association of brokers and deal-
ers that the rules of the association be designed "to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, [and] to provide safeguards against unreasonable profits
or unreasonable rates of commissions or other charges." 15 U.S.C. § 780-3
(b) (8) (1970). The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the
only registered association to date, has established a policy of allowing only
"reasonable" underwriter compensation. See Interpretation of Article fI, Sec-
tion I of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, CCH NASD MAuAL 2151, at
2023 (1971). In turn, an SEC guide to the preparation and filing of registra-
tion statements requires disclosure of all forms of underwriter compensation
and a statement of whether the NASD has approved the underwriter compen-
sation. See Guide 17 (Disclosure of Underwriting Discounts and Commis-
sions) in SEC Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements,
SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968). Thus, a blue sky type
of "fair or reasonable" standard is incorporated into regulation at the federal
level.
84. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 359-ff(1) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
85. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 359-ff(3) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
86. UNIFORM SEcuRrmEs Acr § 401(j) (6) states:
The terms defined in this subsection ["sale", "sell", "offer" and
"offer to sell"] do not include (A) . . . ; (B) . . . ; (C) any act
incident to a class vote by stockholders, pursuant to the certificate of
incorporation or the applicable corporation statute, on a merger, con-
solidation, reclassification of securities, or sale of corporate assets in
consideration of the issuance of securities of another corporation; or
(D) any act incident to a judicially approved reorganization in which
a security is issued in exchange for one or more outstanding securi-
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the registration and the antifraud provisions of the blue sky laws
may be inapplicable. An even greater number of states have adopted
a second approach, which is to include the issue of securities through
reorganizations within the statutory definition of "sale" but to ex-
empt the reorganization transaction from registration.87 A few states
ties, claims, or property interests, or partly in such exchange and
partly for cash.
State securities acts that take this definitional exclusion approach are: COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-12(10) (f) (iv) (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 7302(k)(5) (1973); HAWArI REV. STAT. § 485-1(10)(F)(iii) (1968); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 23-2-1-1(i)(7)(C) (Bums 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A,
§ 25(j)(6)(C) (1971); MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 110A, § 401(i)(6)(C)
(Supp. 1974); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 451.801(j)(6)(C) (1967); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 409.401(j)(6)(C) (Supp. 1974); NEv. REV. STAT. § 90.080.6
(c) (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-49(j)(6)(C) (1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 2(18)(c) (Supp. 1973); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10, § 881(j)(6)(C)
(Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2(10) (f) (iii) (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 61-1-13(10)(f)(iii) (1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-4-401(j)(6)(c)
(Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-117.13(i)(6)(C) (1965).
87. Usually, an exemption applies to the registration provisions only, not
to the antifraud provisions. State securities acts that exempt reorganization-
issued securities are: ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 38(n) (Cum. Supp. 1973); ALASKA
STAT. § 45.55.140(b)(15) (Supp. 1973); Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1844(6)
(Supp. 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-322(a)(6)(C) (Supp. 1973);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.06(6) (1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 97-109(l) (Supp.
1973); IDAHO CODE § 30-1435(13) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121%,
§ 137.4(I) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); IowA CODE ANN. § 502.5(6) (Supp.
1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(l) (Supp. 1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 292.410(14) (1971); L. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:705(4) (1965); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 874(10) (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 451, § 15
(1) (1973); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-71-53(5) (1972); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 15-2014(13) (1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1111(14) (Supp. 1973);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-22(N) (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-4(6)
(1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-06.6 (Supp. 1973); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 59.035(13) (1973); R.1. GEN. IUws ANN. § 7-11-9(d) (1970); S.D. COm-
PILED LAws ANN. § 47-31-91 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1632(j)
(1964); Tax. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. § 581-5(G) (1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, § 4204(4) (1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(c)(2) (Supp. 1974) (but
see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(b)(8) (Supp. 1974)); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 21.20.320(14) (Supp. 1973); Ws. STAT. ANN. § 551.23(13) (Spec. Pamph-
let 1974).
The transaction exemptions in these states may not always extend to the
same corporate reorganizations. Some states limit the exemption to mergers
and consolidations, while others extend it to sales of corporate assets, reclassifi-
cations, and reorganizations generally. For a reorganization not covered by
the express language of the statute, a ruling on possible exemption status should
be sought from the blue sky administrator. In several states, a favorable rul-
ing will probably be given. See Bialkin, State Securities Laws, in 1 BusInem
AcQuisrroNs: PLANNING AND PRAcrIcE 441, 444-45 (1. Herz & C. Bailer, eds.
1971).
Under the state securities acts, the party claiming exempt transaction status
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take other approaches to regulation of reorganization-issued securi-
ties, including (1) administrative supervision by means of a fairness
hearing on the plan of reorganization, 8  (2) regulation by means
of interpretive rulings,89 and (3) registration of the securities. 90 The
New Hampshire blue sky law represents one extreme in not requir-
ing registration for any security, whether issued for cash or in a re-
organization; its focus is on the regulation of brokers and dealers. 01
At the other extreme, California has fairly demanding registration
requirements that depend on an administrative finding of "fair-
nesS." 9
2
A. The Uniform Securities Act and
the Definitional Exclusion
The drafters of the USA excluded transfers of securities issued
in certain corporate reorganizations from the definition of "sale" of
a security. 93 In so doing, they "intended to incorporate all of the
SEC's traditional 'no sale theory.' "94 Although the SEC had lim-
ited its no-sale theory under rule 133 to eliminate registration only, 90
the USA definitional exclusion extends to the -fraudulent practices
and civil liabilities provisions of the Act, as well as to the registration
or a definitional exclusion bears the burden of proof that the reorganization
qualifies. E.g., USA § 402(d); CoN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-322(c) (1969);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 402(d) (Supp. 1972). The Draftsmen's
Commentary to USA section 402(d) noted that in cases where the statute was
silent, courts have placed the burden of proof on the party claiming the exemp-
tion. Loss & CowETr 381.
88. See, e.g., Omo. REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.04 (Page 1964). See notes
136-47 infra and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, ch. 3, as amended, Rules Nos.
260.140.60-62 (1969), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 8622 (1973) and Rule No.
260.103(c) (1969), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 8614 (1973); Ohio Div. of
Securities, Administrative Ruling No. 2 (rescinded, effective June 23, 1971),
2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 38,702 (1971). See notes 118-57 infra and accompany-
ing text.
90. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25120, 25140 (West Supp. 1972); Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.09 (Page 1964). See notes 157-62 infra and accom-
panying text.
91. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.1 et seq. (1972).
92. See notes 149-51, 158 infra and accompanying text. There is a lim-
ited exemption available under the California statute. See note 150 infra and
accompanying text.
93. USA § 406(j)(6) (C).
94. See Draftsmen's Commentary to USA § 406(j), in Loss & CowFnrr
95. See text accompanying notes 36-49 supra.
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provisions. 96 In short, the current USA philosophy is to leave re-
organizations unattended by the state securities laws.
The drafters offered several arguments to justify this extension
of the no-sale exclusion to the antifraud and civil liability provisions.
First, they argued that very few existing blue sky laws contained
civil liability provisions applicable to these shareholder vote situa-
tions.97 They apparently believed that, to the extent the USA rep-
resents a codification of existing law, it should take a similar posi-
tion. Their solution was to specifically exclude reorganizations ap-
proved by shareholder vote from the coverage of the Act. Second,
they were reluctant to "disturb whatever jurisprudence now applies"
to these reorganizations under state corporate and general law by
placing mergers and consolidations -within the ambit of the blue sky
law liability provisions as well.98 Third, they argued that, in con-
trast to the regulatory pattern at the federal level, where all the civil
and criminal remedies are available only by virtue of the federal se-
curities acts, the states already had available other statutory and
common law remedies (civil and criminal), including rescission,
deceit and obtaining property by false pretenses, 99 which made
further remedies under the USA unnecessary. Finally, the drafters
argued that section 12(2) of the Securities Act and certain federal
criminal remedies would usually apply to these reorganizations when-
ever an instrument of interstate commerce was used, regardless of
whether or not the securities were registered under the blue sky
laws. 100
The reasons given by the USA drafters for the exclusion of
mergers, consolidations, and other reorganizations from both the an-
tifraud and the civil liability provisions are not convincing. Blue
sky law treatment of -these transactions at the time of the drafting
of the Uniform Securities Act may not have justified exclusion from
the antifraud and civil liability provisions of the USA. The drafters
argued that the USA was only codifying current state practice in
96. Draftsmen's Commentary to USA § 406(j), in Loss & Cows-Tr 347.
See generally Cowett, supra note 7, at 421; Jennings, supra note 80, at 218-
20, 228-30; Note, The Uniform Securities Act, 12 STAN. L. REv. 103, 129-33
(1959). The fraudulent practices and civil liabilities provisions are USA §§
101 and 410(a)(12), respectively; the registration requirements are USA §§
302-05.
97. Draftsmen's Commentary to USA § 401(j), in Loss & Cown-r 347.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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this area.' 0 ' The majority of blue sky laws purported to exempt
some or all of ,these corporate events; they did not follow a defini-
tional exclusion approach.' 0 2  If, as the drafters imply, these ex-
emptions in fact extended to the civil liability provisions, 0 3 then they
were no different in effect from a definitional exclusion: both ap-
proaches remove these reorganization-issued securities from the sub-
stantive provisions of the blue sky law. The USA approach there-
fore would not have been without precedent. But it was question-
able precedent at best. When carefully read, many of the exempt-
ions apparently did not cover the corporate reorganizations event-
ually excluded by USA section 401(j) (6) (C). In an article post-
dating the drafting of the Act, Edward Cowett stated that, -while
more than 30 statutes purported to exempt these corporate events,
a "closer examination reveals that the exemptions may be illusory in
many instances."' 0 4  In short, state regulation of reorganization-
issued securities was more complex than the drafters would have us
believe. In fact, while the drafters argued that existing civil lia-
bility provisions did not apply here, Mr. Cowett concluded that many
reorganization-issued securities had been issued in violation of the
blue sky laws and thus had created "potential civil liability of sub-
stantial proportions."' 0 5
Nonetheless, even assuming the drafters correctly characterized
existing state law, the absence of civil liability provisions applicable
to these shareholder-vote reorganizations in the blue sky laws should
not have precluded the drafters from including such coverage in the
USA. In areas of blue sky coverage where reform was needed, the
USA drafters rewrote the law. For example, in USA section 101,
the general antifraud provision, modeled after the SEC's Rule
10b-5,' 06 the drafters created liability for half-truths in the purchase
or sale of securities.' 0 7 This liability for half-truths was not com-
101. See Draftsmen's Commentary to § 401(j), in Loss & CowE-r 347.
102. Id. at 346; Cowett, supra note 7, at 422.
103. The drafters state that "very few of the existing statutes contain civil
liability provisions which apply in these class vote situations." Draftsmen's
Commentary to § 401(j), in Loss & COWETr 347. Since they also state that
a majority of statutes exempt some or all of the reorganizations covered by
USA section 401(j)(6)(C) (id. at 346), it appears that the only way so few
statutes could provide for civil liability in these situations is if the exemptions
cut across the civil liability provisions as well as the registration provisions.
104. Cowett, supra note 7, at 423.
105. Id. at 427.
106. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
107. USA § 101(2). See Draftsmen's Commentary to § 101, in Loss &
CowETr 251.
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mon in existing blue sky laws.' 08 USA section 407 expanded the
investigation and subpoena powers to give the administrator more
authority than he typically had under existing statutes. 10 9 The con-
tent of the registration statement required under section 304 was
"spelled out more fully and specifically" than most registration state-
ments then in use.1 0 Further, in drafting the civil liability provisions
of section 410(a), the drafters sought to correct "one of the areas
most in need of reform.""' Thus, reform was undertaken in in-
stances where it was needed and could have been undertaken in
the corporate reorganization context as well. Since mergers, con-
solidations, and other reorganizations may present serious investor
protection concerns, these situations require at least that general an-
tifraud and criminal remedies be available. Indeed, the federal
experience under rule 133 led the SEC to conclude that much more
was required, so that now substantial disclosure is demanded under
rule 145. The rationales that failed to support the no-sale rule
under federal practice cannot be used to support a broader applica-
tion of that rule at the state level.
Second, the drafters' reluctance to "disturb whatever jurispru-
dence now applies" to reorganizations by allowing the civil liabilities
provisions of the USA to cover reorganization-issued securities was
unfounded. The imposition of the registration, antifraud, and civil
liability provisions over nonexempt securities and transactions was
found to be necessary in other contexts despite possible infringement
of existing state law. Moreover, the antifraud and civil liability pro-
visions continued to apply in the case of a security or transaction for
which an exemption was available; the exemption applied only to .the
registration provisions. There, the disturbance of '"whatever juris-
prudence now applies" must have been considered necessary. It is
difficult to understand why the inclusion of mergers and consolida-
tions under these provisions would cause any greater disruption of
current state corporate reorganization law than similar instances of
securities regulation impose upon other areas of corporate law. Fur-
ther, in some instances, the results reached under existing provisions
of state corporate reorganization law were questionable and could
108. See Draftsmen's Commentary to § 101, in Loss & CowErr 251.
109. USA § 407. See Draftsmen's Commentary to § 407, in Loss & Cow-
ETT 386.
110. USA § 304(b). See Draftsmen's Commentary to § 304(b), in Loss
& CowETr 304.
111. USA § 410(a). See Draftsmen's Commentary to § 410(a), in Loss
& CowETr 390.
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have been properly replaced -with, inter alia, the civil liability pro-
visions of the blue sky law. For example, a director or shareholder
validation provision in a state corporation statute might have been
used to validate the most suspect conflict-of-interest merger and fore-
close any inquiry by complaining shareholders into the actual fair-
ness of the reorganization."12 The close scrutiny of a judicial or
administrative inquiry under provisions of a 'blue sky law would be
an appropriate response to such questions. Thus the need for in-
vestor protection seems just as great in either case. Even if some
disturbance of existing state law be assumed, it is clear that the
drafters failed to show that the additional investor remedies and pro-
tection would not outweigh the disturbance.
Third, the existence of other state remedies should not have de-
terred the drafters from affording the protection of antifraud and
civil liability provisions to reorganization-share recipients. The dif-
ficulties in obtaining relief -under state statutory and common law
often foil the legitimate plaintiff. For example, the plaintiff may
have to prove scienter or reliance in an action at law for deceit,1 3
while these burdens may properly be lessened under a state securi-
ties act." 4  In addition, where a claim can be brought only as a
derivative action under state corporation law, the plaintiff will face
several often insurmountable hurdles. 1 5  To remedy this situation,
the registration, antifraud, and civil liability provisions of the USA
should be extended to the statutory merger and consolidation trans-
actions. The concurrent coverage of the existing state law remedies
112. The courts have not always tolerated such results. See, e.g., Remillard
Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66
(1952). See generally Coffey, Book Review, 23 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 976,
983-4 (1972).
113. See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 105-10, at 683-736 (4th ed.
1971).
114. See, e.g., Draftsmen's Commentary to USA § 410(a), in Loss & Cow-
Err 392: "The 'by means of' clause in line 8 [of USA § 410(a)(2)] is not
intended as a requirement that the buyer prove reliance on the untrue statement
or the omission. He must show only that he did not know of it."
115. These hurdles include the "contemporaneous share ownership" re-
quirement, the posting of security for litigation expenses (or possible reim-
bursement of defendants' expenses even where security is not required before
the litigation), short statutes of limitations for some types of actions against
management, shareholder validation statutes and case law, requirements of
prior demand on the board of directors and/or shareholders, unresolved ques-
tions of standing to sue in the merger and consolidation situations and general
judicial deference to management decisions under the "sound business judg-
ment" rule. See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW oF CoRPoRATioNs AND
AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERiusns §§ 352-72 (1970).
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and additional securities law provisions that exists in the case of
other securities issues should not be objectionable in issues through
reorganizations.
Fourth, the drafters reach too far in arguing that state securities
law remedies are unnecessary in view of the availability of federal
civil and criminal remedies when the jurisdictional means are used.
If the availability of federal remedies obviates the need for registra-
tion or antifraud remedies in a merger, consolidation, or sale of
assets, all transactions which produce many of the same investor pro-
tection concerns that are present in the cash-for-stock issuance, then
logically state registration and antifraud protection would also be un-
necessary in all other transactions presently covered by the federal
securities laws.
Even if -the USA had excluded reorganization issues from the
definition of "sale" only for purposes of registration, that decision
would now have to be reconsidered. The drafters commented that
in USA section 401(j)(6)(C) they were adopting the SEC's no-
sale theory, which was based on the "corporate action," as opposed
to the "individual volition," view of the security holders' decision to
approve a plan of merger or consolidation." 6 This rationale is not
tenable in view of the decisions an individual shareholder must make:
first, how to vote, and second, whether to exercise dissenter's rights.
The rationale was criticized throughout the history of SEC rule 133
and rejected in practice by rule 145.1 7
A more basic -flaw exists in the approach taken by the USA to-
ward statutory mergers and consolidations. The position of the USA
with regard to these organizations is contrary to the paternalistic
philosophy of 'blue sky law regulation." 8 State common law gen-
erally has little or no -prophylactic effect. The blue sky laws were
designed to solve this problem. Yet by allowing the issuer to avoid
registration in a merger or consolidation, and by relegating the dis-
appointed investor to after-the-fact fraud remedies, the state fails to
take the preventive measures in these reorganization contexts that it
takes in subjecting other securities issues to a critical, qualitative
116. The USA definitions of "sale" and "offer" include the "for value" ele-
ment found in the Securities Act section 2(3) definition. USA § 401(j) (1),
(2). These definitions thus seem to afford a statutory basis for raising the
"volition-value" argument at the state level as it was at the federal level. See
notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text.
117. See text accompanying notes 37-65 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 77-85 supra.
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review before registration is approved.1 9 Thus by definitionally
excluding from blue sky law coverage issues through reorganizations,
the drafters of the USA -abandoned the state policy of initially pre-
venting the sale of undesirable securities. Given the history of
abuse of the merger and consolidation as a means of passing large
quantities of questionable securities on to .the investing public, 20
these reorganizations seem to call for the critical administrative in-
quiry that is basic to blue sky regulation. This review is particularly
necessary where the issuance of securities is not subject to the fed-
oral registration provisions, as where an intrastate,' 2 small offer-
ing,' 22 or private offering 23 exemption is available at the federal
level. Here, a state administrative inquiry will be the only pre-
issuance safeguard covering such securities.
B. Exempt Transaction Treatment Under the Blue Sky Laws
A blue sky exemption for securities issued in reorganizations
typically exempts the securities from registration only-not from the
antifraud provisions.' 24 In giving the exemption for registration
only, the states reach much the same result as the SEC did in limit-
ing its no-sale rule so as to obviate registration while leaving the anti-
119. But administrative discretion under the USA is less than that available
under the "fairness" standard under other blue sky laws. See note 79 supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 17-50 supra.
121. Intrastate issues are exempt under § 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act.
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970).
122. Under § 3(b) of the Securities Act, the SEC has the power to exempt
offerings of less than $500,000 in value, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970), and the
Commission did so by promulgating Regulation A. SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.251-.263 (1972).
123. The private offering exemption arises out of Securities Act § 4(2)
("transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering"). 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(2) (1970).
124. See generally Official Comment to § 402(a) and Draftsmen's Com-
mentary to § 402(a), in Loss & CowFrr 352-53. A few states exempt some
transactions from all of the provisions of the blue sky law, including the civil
liability and antifraud provisions. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(c) (2)
(Supp. 1974), which exempts from all provisions of the act "any transaction
incident to a right of conversion or a statutory or judicially approved reclassifi-
cation, recapitalization, reorganization, quasi-reorganization, stock split, reverse
stock split, merger, consolidation or sale of assets." The practical effect of
such all-encompassing exemptions is the same as that of the definitional exclu-
sion approach of the Uniform Securities Act. The broad Virginia exemption
is subject to one qualification, however:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (c) (2), the merger
or consolidation of corporations shall be a violation of this chapter
if the surviving or new corporation has more than thirty security
holders and all the securities of the parties thereto were issued under
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fraud provisions in effect.' 25 Thus, while the definitional exclusion
of these reorganizations from the USA was said by the drafters to be
an adoption of the SEC's no-sale theory, the exempt transaction ap-
proach may be closer to SEC practice under rule 133.
In fact, rule 133 may have 'been narrower than present exempt-
transaction provisions in the blue sky laws. Not only did the SEC
limit the rule 133 exemption to the registration provisions of the Se-
curities Act, but it also refused to allow the exemption in situations
where security-holder control made a vote on a plan of merger or
consolidation a "mere formality," where the reorganization was part
of a two-step scheme to distribute securities to the public without
registration, where security holders -were offered a choice of securities
in the transaction, or where unanimous shareholder approval was
a condition to the reorganization.' 2 6 On the blue sky side, there is
no indication that such limitations are in effect in any of the states
that have adopted the exempt transaction approach. However, the
administrator's discretionary power to deny or revoke the exemption
of issues in a merger or consolidation could probably be used to
achieve a similar result. For example, the Alabama blue sky law
gives exempt transaction status to certain reorganizations and re-
classifications but, at the same time, provides the administrator with
the power to revoke or deny the exemption where he finds that the
sale of given securities would defraud the purchaser.' 27 It would
not be unprecedented in blue sky regulation to interpret "defraud"
more broadly than common law deceit and thus give additional dis-
cretion to the administrator.128 However, notwithstanding the avail-
this exemption, unless all of the parties thereto have been engaged
in transacting business for more than two years prior to the merger
or consolidation.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(b) (8) (Supp. 1974).
125. See text accompanying notes 36-53 supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 36-49 supra.
127. ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 38(n) (Cum. Supp. 1973). Other blue sky laws
have a similar provision. This type of sanction may be applied to one or more
specific securities and/or transactions otherwise exempt under the particular
blue sky law. Application varies somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
A few jurisdictions give the blue sky administrator this power over all or most
of the exemption provisions. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 451, § 15(l)
(1973). For -the comparable USA provisions and comments, see Loss & Cow-
Ecr 379-80. The blue sky administrator typically has other weapons he can
bring to bear against an offer or sale of suspect securities, including investiga-
tory, subpoena, and injunctive powers. See, e.g., MimN. STAT. ANN. ch. 451,
H8 20, 21 (1973).
128. See USA § 401(d); Official Comment and Draftsmen's Commentary
to § 401(d), in Loss & CowETr 337-38; see also USA § 306(a)(2)(E); Offi-
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ability of -this administrative power, the transaction exemption al-
lowed under the blue sky laws has broader application to corporate
reorganizations than did the exemption afforded -by the SEC under
rule 133.
Though exemptions free the issuer from assessment of the se-
curities by the blue sky administrator, qualifying for these exemptions
may still pose a problem. The party claiming the exemption has the
burden of proving its applicability, 12 9 and the lack of uniform re-
quirements from state to state makes this task difficult.130 There
are differences in the forms 'used, the information requested by the
state, and -the procedures to be followed in establishing exempt
transaction status for the reorganization or in registering the security
if such status is not sought.' 3 1  In addition, the exercise of the power
of the administrator to deny or revoke the exemption' 3 2 may vary
cial Comment and Draftsmen's Commentary to § 306(a), in Loss & Cownrr
326, 328-29.
129. See note 87 supra.
130. Not only may formal blue sky law requirements and propedures vary
from state to state, but success with the blue sky administration may depend
upon familiarity with informal, unpublished administrative practices and some
knowledge of how to secure and use administration assistance. Loss & Cow-
Ear 44. Loss and Cowett conclude that "the practice of blue sky law has be-
come a highly specialized art. Only those lawyers who devote a substantial
amount of their practice to blue sky matters develop the expertness necessary
to bring order out of the statutory and administrative morass." Id. Indeed,
achieving simultaneous federal and state effectiveness has been described as a
"minor miracle." Cowett, supra note 80, at 296. See generally Loss & Cow-
Err 43-128.
131. For example, Iowa requires that the proposed plan of merger or con-
solidation be appproved by the commissioner of insurance, and the commis-
sioner may demand any information he deems necessary to help him make that
decision. IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.5(6) (Supp. 1974). The Kansas adminis-
trator will approve an exemption for a merger or consolidation only where the
issuer files notice detailing the terms of the offer and "such other information
as the commissioner may require." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(l) (Supp.
1972). Following such disclosure, the exemption is effective "if the commis-
sioner does not by order disallow the exemption within thirty days." Id. Sim-
ilarly, Minnesota requires that the commissioner be provided with a description
of the plan of merger or consolidation and "other information as he prescribes
by rule . . . ." MiNN. STAT. ANN. ch. 451, § 15(2)(l) (1973). Virginia
modifies in one statutory subsection (VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(b) (8) (Supp.
1974)) what seems to be a broad exemption for mergers and consolidations
granted in another subsection (VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(c)(2) (Supp.
1974)). See note 124 supra. Texas has added the proviso that the sharehold-
ers must not be required to pay any consideration beyond the surrender of the
security of the decedent corporation. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 581-5(G)
(1964). Other minor variations of exempt transaction treatment of statutory
mergers and consolidations can be found throughout the blue sky laws.
132. See note 127 supra. Blue sky administrators also have the power to
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from a practice of benign neglect to strict scrutiny of the corporate
events taking place under the exemption.133 Finally, the scope of
the exemption varies among the states, so that some reorganizations
-for example, a sale of substantially all the assets of one corpora-
tion for the stock of another-will be exempt under some statutes
and not others.' 34 This factor diminishes the benefit of exemptions
that do apply for multistate offerings.
By granting reorganization-issued securities an unwarranted ex-
emption, the states have in effect abandoned the preventive pater-
nalistic inquiry into the quality of -the security and relegated the in-
vestor to after-the-fact fraud remedies. The exempt transaction ap-
proach to regulation of reorganization-issued securities, like the USA
definitional exclusion, fails to affordfull -blue sky investor protection
in a situation in chich it is needed. Although under most of the
exemptions the civil liability and antifraud provisions will be appli-
cable to these securities, shareholders who may participate in a reor-
ganization exchange would benefit .from the blue sky administrative
review. A blue sky exemption should be made available only where
it is reasonably certain that investor concerns will not arise or where
an alternative source of regulation can assure an adequate, compar-
able level of investor protection.' 35 This is not the case in most
corporate reorganizations.
revoke or suspend a registration of securities, but the power may be seldom
exercised. Less formal action is usually taken where the administrator objects,
for whatever reason, to the proposed issue. Loss & Cow=xr 80-81.
133. With regard to exemptions generally available under the blue sky laws,
Loss and Cowett note that "[tihe word 'exemptions' opens a big subject, be-
cause they are manifold and variegated .... [H]ere, too, statutory language
is sometimes one thing and administrative practice another." Loss & CowETr
81. The cautious practitioner will nonetheless look beyond administrative
practice to the ultimate question of liability:
[E]ven though the administrator turns his head the other way, the
statute more likely than not declares that all sales in violation of any
of its provisions are voidable. Indeed, the courts are apt to say so
even if the statute does not. And, regardless of the administrator's
policy not to enforce the statute in certain cases, or his inability to
do so as a practical matter, the courts in civil actions will have to
take the statute as they find it. This is one of the sources of inno-
cently assumed contingent civil liabilities ....
Id. at 83.
134. See note 87 supra.
135. Ideally, an exemption will not be available to cover securities or trans-
actions that are completely unregulated. Banks, insurance companies, public
utilities, interstate carriers, and certain other types of corporations may be
given securities exemptions because separate regulatory agencies oversee their
activities. See, e.g., Securities Act §§ 3(a)(2), (5), (6), (8), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77c(a)(2), (5), (6), (8) (1972); USA §§ 402(a)(3), (4), (5), (6),
19741
182 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
A second type of exemption is one from registration following
administrative "fairness" hearings on the proposed plan of reor-
ganizations. 13 6  Ohio has such a provision, though its avail-
ability is limited.1 37 A corporation that is organized under the laws
of Ohio or has its principal place of business in Ohio may request
a hearing before the Ohio Division of Securities.' 3 8  The Division
may approve the terms of the issuance and exchange of securities
under the proposed plan of reorganization, and those securities are
then exempt from registration under the Ohio Securities Act. 3 9 The
importance of these exemptions for judicially or administratively
(7). Most states exempt securities listed on major exchanges, presumably be-
cause the listing requirements and continued exchange supervision sufficiently
protect the investor. See USA § 402(a) (8). Transaction exemptions may be
available for similar reasons, as where certain non-issuer distributions are al-
lowed if (A) a recognized securities manual contains specified information
about the issuer; or (B) the security has a fixed maturity, interest, or dividend
provision and has no recent record of payment default. See USA § 402(b)
(2). Other exemptions may have a more practical basis, as where the USA
temporarily and conditionally exempts preincorporation subscriptions because
of the preliminary nature of the undertaking and information. USA § 402(b)
(10). Not all such exemptions will have a reasonable basis in fact; the al-
ternative regulation or lack of investor concern may not really be there. See
SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U.S. 65, 77-80 (1959) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (no federal exemption for variable annuity contracts because state
regulation inadequate). In the tentative draft of the ALI Federal Securities
Code, Professor Loss has narrowed the current exemption for bank securities
to cover only depositors' accounts or their equivalent. ALI FED. SEC. CODE
§ 301 (Tent. Draft No. 1, April 25, 1972). The current exemption (Securities
Act § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(7) (1970)) exempts all bank securities.
See generally R.W. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., SECURrrIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS, 603-04, 610-12 (1972); Loss & CowETr 81-83.
136. See Glickman, The State Administrative Fairness Hearing and Section
3(a)(10) of the Securities Act-Some Questions, 45 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 644
(1971).
137. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.04 (Page 1964). See note 142 infra.
Professor Loss describes the similar Ohio, California, Indiana, and Wisconsin
provisions as "going to the other extreme of providing special administrative
procedures" when compared to the exemption or exclusion approach. 1 Loss
539-40. An Ohio exemption created by an administrative ruling that has sine
been repealed once undermined the usefulness of the Ohio provision. See text
accompanying notes 152-57 infra.
138. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04 (Page 1964).
139. Id. If no transaction exemption, definitional exclusion, or fairness
hearing exemption is available at the state level, the issuer may still qualify
for another exemption, for example, if his security is listed or approved for
listing upon a qualified stock exchange (see, e.g., USA § 402(a)(8)), or if
the issuer is a bank, savings and loan association, insurance company, credit
union, railroad, common carrier or public utility, all of which are regulated
by separate state or federal agencies (see, e.g., USA § 402(a)(3)-(7)).
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supervised reorganizations may be substantial in light of SEC rule
145. For example, the administrative hearing under the Ohio Se-
curities Act apparently meets the requirements of the official hearing
and approval needed for an exemption under section 3(a)(10) of
the Securities Act.140 Since the securities -practitioner may want to
use the section 3(a)(10) exemption to avoid federal registration,'1 4 1
now required under rule 145, the administrative hearing procedure
may get much more use than it has in the past.1 42
From the standpoint of -federal and state regulatory policies,
there are some difficulties with the fairness hearing approach. It
allows a single blue sky administrator to cut away at will the dis-
140. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1970). See note 32 supra. See generally
Note, Prereorganization Negotiations and Section 5(C): A Proposed Solution
to the Gunjumping Problem, 24 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 731, 739-41 (1973).
The Uniform Securities Act, with its definitional exclusion for corporate reor-
ganizations, does not give the blue sky administrator the authority to make the
fairness determination necessary to secure the section 3(a)(10) exemption.
141. See, e.g., American Financial Leasing and Servs. Co., [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,376 (SEC 1971). But if the
merger agreement is made final prior to approval by the blue sky adminis-
trator, no federal exemption is available. Fidelity Financial Corp., [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 78,840 (SEC 1972).
142. Blue sky administrators may become much less willing to grant the
fairness hearing. The Commissioner of the Ohio Division of Securities re-
cently concluded that:
in light of the principles underlying Section 3(a)(10), the regu-
latory interests and the manpower resources of the Division, and the
widespread existence of market preconditioning (gun jumping) in
connection with reorganization transactions for which applications
have been made in the past, the exercise of its discretion in the grant-
ing of fairness hearings should, as a matter of policy, be restricted
to transactions which are particularly suitable for determination by
this agency.
OHIO SEculrriEs BuLL., June 1973, at 5. A proposed new Ohio Securities Act
does not contain a provision comparable to Ohio Revised Code § 1707.04, re-
flecting "the opinion of the Division that this provision does not involve a suffi-
ciently important regulatory interest to justify a commitment of the additional
manpower resources required for -this type of proceeding." Id. If the Ohio
fairness hearing is available, it can result in exemptions for both state and fed-
eral registration. The California fairness hearing, however, generally occurs
in connection with registration at the state level, so only a federal exemption
can be secured through this procedure. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25142 (West
Supp. 1974); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, ch. 3, as amended, Rule No. 260.140-
.62 (1969), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 8622 (1973). The California statute
will permit the use of a hearing even where the security or transaction is other-
wise exempt from the permit qualification requirement. CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 25142 (West Supp. 1974); see Draftsmen's Commentary to the 1968 Califor-
nia Corporation Code, in H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CAL-
IFORNIA CORPORATE SECtRmEs LAW OF 1968, at 580-81; Glickman, supra note
136, at 655-56.
19741
184 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
closure protection of the Securities Act for all other states in which
the securities will be distributed. Unless the administrator requires
the dissemination of structured information to the offerees as an
element of the fairness deterffiination, 143 the federal regulatory
scheme is accepting a process that ignores disclosure to investors.1 4 4
There are practical difficulties as well. In order to secure the sec-
tion 3(a) (10) exemption, an issuer may -attempt to use the fairness
hearing of a state with which it has no substantial connection, and
that state may in fact grant rather perfunctory approval of the re-
organization exchange. 45  The state may also lack the personnel
and budget to conduct an adequate inquiry at a hearing;146 thus the
proceeding may become largely ex parte, to the detriment of the
interests of the investors. For these reasons, at least one commen-
tator has suggested that the section 3(a)(10) exemption be abol-
ished.' 4 7
Generally, blue sky administrators have the power to issue in-
terpretive rulings on the scope or applicability of transaction ex-
emptions. Though that power is not often used, 148 -there are oc-
casional exceptions. In California, a state which does not broadly
exempt or exclude most reorganizations from registration, 49 the
commissioner has used his rulemaking authority to add to a limited
statutory exemption. By statute, California exempts from registra-
tion the issue of securities in a reorganization where fewer than 25
143. The Ohio Division of Securities has concluded that offerees in the ex-
change of securities must be given "adequate disclosure documents which will
be subject to Division approval." OMO Sncuarrms BULL., June 1973, at 5.
144. See Glickman, supra note 136, at 663-64.
145. Id. at 648-55; R. JENNiNGS & H. MARSH, SEcuRrrrs REGuLATioN:
CASES AND MATERIALS 539 n.14 (3d ed. 1972).
146. See Glickman, supra note 136, at 651-53.
147. Id. at 663-64. Of course, if the issuer does secure a section 3(a) (10)
exemption, the opportunity to use the registration-by-coordination provisions
available in many blue sky jurisdictions (see USA § 303 and note 169 infra)
will be lost. But that difficulty arises only if registration of the reorganization
is necessary at the state level in the first place. Typically, such registration
is not required. See notes 86-135 supra and accompanying text.
148. Loss & CowETr 44. Although these authors' observations were made
in 1958, there has been relatively little added by way of administrative ruling
or interpretation in the intervening years.
149. Registration requirements generally apply to reorganizations in Cal-
ifornia, and the commissioner has promulgated a number of rules pertaining
to the granting of a qualification permit to issue reorganization securities. See
notes 158-61 infra and accompanying text. The permit qualification require-
ment for recapitalizations and reorganizations is set forth in CAL. CoRi. CODE
§ 25120 (West Supp. 1974).
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percent of the shares to be exchanged are held by California resi-
dents.150 The commissioner has extended this exemption to a re-
organization involving a parent company and a wholly owned sub-
sidiary by ruling that the same exemption will be available when the
issuer of the securities is a corporation holding all the stock of the
surviving, consolidated, or purchasing corporation. 151
The Ohio experience in exempting mergers and consolidations
under a 1938 administrative ruling is an interesting case study in the
use of administrative power to create an exemption through interpre-
tation of a blue sky law. Until 1971, the Ohio administrator did not
require registration of securities issued for statutory mergers and
consolidations, under an administrative ruling interpreting Ohio Re-
vised Code section 1707.03(K)(2), which exempts from registra-
tion the distribution or exchange by a corporation of its securities
with its shareholders. 152  The subsection does not appear to apply to
150. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25103(c) (West Supp. 1974). The exemption is
further narrowed by defining "outstanding shares" as not including either se-
curities controlled by a person who controls 50 percent or more of that class
of securities or securities which the issuer knows to be held by broker dealers
in street name accounts. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25103(d) (West Supp. 1974).
151. CAL. ADDmI. CODE tit. 10, ch. 3, as amended, Rule No. 260.103(c)
(1969), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. IT 8614, at 4520-21 (1972).
152. The exemption covers "the exchange of any security by the issuer ex-
clusively with its existing security holders, where no commission or other re-
muneration is given directly or indirectly for soliciting such exchange. . ....
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.03(k)(2) (Page 1964).
The ruling read as follows:
RULNG 2-R.C. § 1707.03(K)-ExcHANGE OF SEcuRrIEs OF MERGED
OR CONSOLIDATED CORPORATIONS
FACTS--Two domestic corporations are to be consolidated under
the provisions of the General Corporation Act of Ohio. The result-
ant corporation will issue its securities to the shareholders of the con-
stituent corporations in exchange for the securities of such corpora-
tions held by such shareholders.
QUESTION-(l) Can an exemption be claimed under the pro-
visions of R.C. § 1707.03(K)?
(3) Would the answer be different if there is a merger instead
of a consolidation?
RULING-() The Corporation Act provides that all the debts,
liabilities and duties of the respective constituent corporations shall
attach to the consolidated corporation (R.C. § 1701.81). The con-
solidated corporation may enforce stock subscription agreements
against subscribers to shares in the constituent corporations. It ap-
pears, therefore, that the transaction exemption provided in R.C.
§ 1707.03 (K) may be claimed with respect to an exchange by the
consolidated corporation for the shares of the constituent corpora-
tions.
(3) The above ruling would not be changed by the fact that a
1974]
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the exchange of securities of an acquiring corporation in a merger
for the securities of the shareholders of an acquired corporation. 153
Nor does it cover the exchanges involved in a consolidation. 154 The
section does not require, or even mention, a shareholder class vote
approving the plan of reorganization. 155 Nonetheless, the Ohio Di-
vision of Securities ruled that the exemption could be claimed with
respect to the exchange involved in a merger or consolidation.' 56
The ruling obtained a result similar to rule 133 from a statutory sec-
tion that did not deal with -the corporate events subject to rule 133
treatment. After more than three decades of practice under this
administrative ruling, the Division of Securities concluded in a 1971
policy statement that this interpretation of the statutory language
was incorrect, that no exemption should be allowed, and that regis-
tration of securities issued in these reorganizations would therefore
be required in Ohio. 157
C. Alternative Blue Sky Schemes for Regulation of
Securities Issued in Reorganizations
A handful of states do not follow either the definitional exclusion
merger is effected rather than a consolidation. The Corporation Act
does not distinguish between mergers and consolidations in any man-
ner which would affect the reasoning of Part (1) of this ruling.
Ohio Div. of Securities, Administrative Ruling No. 2, 2 BLuE SKY L.
REP. ff 38,702 (1970) (rescinded, effective June 23, 1971).
153. "Blue Sky" Regulations Statement Issued by Ohio Division of Securi-
ties, 44 OmO B. Ass'N REP. 1075, 1076-79 (Sept. 20, 1971).
154. Id.
155. The subsection is virtually identical, in fact, to section 3(a)(9) of the
Securities Act (15 U.S.C. § 77.c(a) (9) (1970)), which provides an exemption
for a corporate exchange of securities with its existing security holders where
no commission is to be paid for soliciting the exchange. See note 36 supra.
Section 3(a)(9) was not intended to exempt securities issued in a merger or
consolidation. See "Blue Sky" Regulations Statement, supra note 153, at 1077;
note 36 supra and accompanying text.
156. Ohio Div. of Securities, Administrative Ruling No. 2, 2 BLUE SKY L.
RP. 38,702 (1970).
157. A comprehensive analysis of the problems involved in this Ohio ad-
ministrative ruling is found in a statement of the Ohio Division of Securities
on its policy regarding the sale of securities in a merger or consolidation. The
statement is reprinted as "Blue Sky" Regulations Statement, supra note 153.
At the time of the policy statement, the Division stated that it would take
a "no action" position with regard to issuers who continued to rely upon the
administrative ruling in effecting a merger or consolidation until the Division
published its "final conclusions" regarding these reorganizations. Id. at 1081.
The Division recently rescinded this no-action position. Registration and li-
censing generally have been required in these transactions as of January 1,
1974. Omo SECURiTiEs BULL., Sept. 1973, at 2-3, 4. The administrative fair-
ness hearing approach under Ohio Revised Code § 1707.04 may be available
in limited circumstances. See notes 136-42 supra and accompanying text.
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approach or exempt transaction approach to corporate reorgani-
zations -taken by the vast majority of blue sky jurisdictions. These
alternative approaches can be examined to see if and how they deal
with the difficulties that exist under the more prevalent blue sky
treatments; of interest here are -the regulatory schemes of California
and Pennsylvania and an approach taken in a proposed revision of
the Ohio Securities Act.
California affords these reorganization issues the full review it
gives -to other nonexempt distributions of securities, unless 'fewer than
25 percent of the shares involved are held 'by California residents.
Therefore, these issues must qualify for the permit required under
the statute. The permit is granted only if the commissioner decides
after close scrutiny that the reorganization is "fair, just, and equi-
table."' 5 8 The commissioner has adopted strict rules for proxy so-
licitation, disclosure of information, and other conditions to the grant-
ing of a permit.159 One rule provides that the commissioner may
condition the grant of the permit on the "affirmative vote of a
specified percentage of the outstanding stock held by persons other
than those who have a conflict of interest in connection with the
adoption of the plan of reorganization.' 60  Under rules containing
undefined terms such as "conflict of interest" the commissioner thus
retains a great deal of discretion and can impose stringent require-
ments on an issuer.
The California approach views 'the problems present in reorgan-
izations as the proper subject of blue sky paternalistic inquiry. 16'
158. California has one of the most complex and comprehensive blue sky
laws, and the Commissioner of corporations has issued many regulations that
add substantially to the statutory structure. See CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 25000-
804 (West Supp. 1974) and CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, ch. 3, as amended,
Rules Nos. 250.1-260.617 (1972), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 8611-38, at
4501-608 (1972). See also Releases by the California Commissioner of Cor-
porations, 1 BLuE SKY L. REP. 8653-707, at 4609-56 (1972). Where
no exemption is available, securities issued in mergers, consolidations,
and other reorganizations or recapitalizations must meet -the permit qualifica-
tion requirements under the securities act before an offer or sale can be made.
CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25120 (West Supp. 1974).
159. See, e.g., Rule No. 260.140.60 (relating to the filing of proxy mate-
rials); Rule No. 260.140.61 (related to securing fairness in the plan of reor-
ganization; conditioning the permit on a vote by persons other than those in
a conflict of interest position); Rule No. 260.140.62 (hearings). CAL. ADmN.
CODE tit. 10, ch. 3, as amended, Rules Nos. 260.140.60-62 (1969), 1
BL E SKY L. REP. 8622 (1973).
160. Rule No. 260.140.61, supra note 159.
161. California's comprehensive scheme of administrative supervision of
qualification by permit of securities issued in recapitalizations and reorganiza-
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Inherent in its position is the judgment that mere disclosure, the
basis of the federal secutities laws, does not suffice -for reorganiza-
tions any more than it does for other issues.162  In contrast, Penn-
sylvania and the proposed Ohio Securities Act exempt reorganiza-
tion issues of securities from registration if disclosure is ensured.
Pennsylvania's securities act, 10 3 while modeled in part after the Uni-
form Securities Act, does not follow the USA definitional exclusion
treatment of securities issued in corporate reorganizations. The
Pennsylvania statute creates instead an exemption for securities is-
sued in mergers, consolidations, and certain other reorganizations if
one of two conditions is met: one party to the transaction either
(1) must file proxy materials under section 14(a) of the Exchange
Act, if that party is required or permitted to do so, at least 10 days
prior to the shareholder meeting at which the plan of reorganization
is -to be presented and must see that these proxy materials are dis-
tributed to the shareholders of the corporations involved; or (2)
must submit such materials as the Pennsylvania Commissioner may
require 'by regulation, and upon approval by the Commissioner, must
distribute these materials 'to the security holders of the corporations
involved.'0 4 (When applicable, new SEC rule 145 requires that
tions, with emphasis on the administrative determination of what is "fair, just,
or equitable" (CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140 (West Supp. 1974)), has been the
frequent subject of commentary in the law journals, particularly following the
initial appearance of the Uniform Securities Act. See, e.g., Jennings, The
Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 193 (1958); Pearce, California Corporate Securities Law v.
Proposed Uniform Securities Law, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1957); Note, Protection
for Shareholder Interests in Recapitalizations of Publicly Held Corporations, 58
COLUM. L. REv. 1031, 1048-55 (1958); Note, The Uniform Securities Act, 12
STAN. L. REV. 103, 129-33 (1959).
162. The need for a genuine inquiry at the state level into the quality of
securities 'being used has often been advanced as an argument against federal
preemption of the entire field of securities regulation. See, e.g., Jennings, su-
pra note 161. Orschel, Administrative Protection for Shareholders in California
Recapitalizations, 4 STAN. L. REv. 215 (1952); Wright, Correlation of State
Blue Sky Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 258 (1941).
But see Allen, Dissemination of Information Under State Blue Sky Laws-A
Shotgun Wedding, 18 Bus. LAw. 763 (1963); Weinstein, Problems in the
Field of State Securities Regulation, 3 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 381
(1962). See generally Cowett, supra note 80; Loss, Developments in
Blue Sky Laws, 14 Bus. LAw. 1161, 1164 (1959); Symposium, The Opera-
tion and Effectiveness of Blue Sky Legislation, 15 WAYNE L REv. 1401
(1969).
163. Pennsylvania Securities Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 1-101 to 705
(Supp. 1974).
164. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-203(o) (Supp. 1974). The subsection also
allows a limited exemption, similar to the exemption available in California
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such materials be prepared and distributed.165)
A similar, but less rigorous, blue sky exemption is allowed under
the proposed revision of the Ohio Securities Act, 166 currently in com-
mittee before the Ohio General Assembly. Under the proposal,
statutory mergers and consolidations will be exempt from the regis-
tration requirements of the statute with respect to Teorganizations,
reclassifications and similar transactions required to be submitted
to a shareholder vote, only if one of 'two conditions is satisfied: (1)
the securities are registered under the Securities Act; or (2) infor-
mation "substantially equivalent" to a proxy statement or informa-
tion statement required under section 14 of the Exchange Act is
submitted to the shareholders at least 20 days prior to the shareholder
meeting or the date of the transaction if no meeting is held.' 67
The effect of the current Pennsylvania and proposed Ohio ex-
empt transaction provisions is to achieve a standard of disclosure
that assures some minimum level of investor protection during these
corporate events and, at the same time, to lighten the burden of the
blue sky practitioner by adding a much greater degree of uniformity
and coordination between the blue sky procedures and federal pro-
cedures, especially under SEC rule 145. It is this type of simplifi-
cation and streamlining of blue sky procedures that the drafters of
the Uniform Securities Act -were seeking in the Act's provisions for
"registration -by coordination" with the Securities Act of 1933.169
Similar registration by coordination provisions have been adopted
in many state securities acts.' 69 But the Uniform Securities Act reg-
(see note 85 supra and accompanying text), whereby the filing requirements
do not apply if fewer than 25 percent of the security holders are residents of
the state. Id.
165. See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
166. Proposed new Ohio Securities Act § 1707.04(T), S.B. 338, 110th Ohio
Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1973-74). There is no comparable provision in
the current Ohio blue sky law.
167. Id.
168. See USA § 303 [Registration by Coordination] and Official Com-
ments and Draftsmen's Commentaries to USA § 303, in Loss & CowETr 290-
99.
169. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 32 (Cum. Supp. 1974); ALAsKA STAT.
§ 45.55.090 (Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1243 (1966); CoLo. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 125-1-8 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7305 (1973); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 517.08 (1972); HAWAIu REV. STAT. § 485-11 (1968); IDAHo
CODE § 30-1420 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121%, § 137.5(B) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1974); IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-2-1-4 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
1257 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 292.360 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A,
§ 21 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 302 (Supp. 1972); MIcH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 451.703 (1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.303 (Supp.
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istration by coordination requires registration at the state level, while
the Pennsylvania and proposed Ohio provisions exempt the transac-
tions from state registration altogether. 170 Moreover, as the drafts-
men's comments to USA section 303 indicate, registration by coor-
dination was meant only to streamline the content and procedure re-
quired for effectiveness, not to intrude upon the substantive stand-
ards governing that effectiveness.'"" Yet both the Pennsylvania
and proposed Ohio provisions will provide a complete exemption, if
their requirements are mot, and completely remove mergers and
consolidations from the application of any substantive standards of
review. Thus, they essentially abandon the substantive review and
the critical value judgments characteristic of blue sky law paternal-
ism for an approach requiring only disclosure of information. It
must be recognized that this is a basic departure from blue sky
1974); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 15-2009 (1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1106
(1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-19.4 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§ 1-205 (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-154-156 (1962); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 61-1-9 (1968); VA CODE ANN. § 13.1-509 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 21.20.180-200 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.25 (1974); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 17-117.9 (1965).
170. However, the Pennsylvania Securities Act requires that the proxy or
other required materials be filed with the Commissioner (PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
70, §§ 203(o)(i), (ii) (Supp. 1974)), and could, in practice, be little different
from registration by coordination under the Uniform Securities Act. If sub-
stantive standards of review are applied to such materials to determine whether
or not the exemption is effective, there is essentially no exemption provided
at all. Cf. Official Comment and Draftsmen's Commentary to USA § 303 (a),
in Loss & COWETT 290-92. But the Pennsylvania statute seems to anticipate
pro forma approval by the Commissioner when the materials filed give the in-
formation required under the statute; it does not explicitly call for a substantial
inquiry or "fairness" determination. The proposed Ohio provision requires
only that the proxy materials or their substantial equivalent be distributed to
the security holders prior to the vote on the plan of reorganization. The ex-
emption does not require a filing of materials with the administrator and there-
fore does not provide for any administrative review. See text accompanying
notes 166-67 supra. Thus, the proposed Ohio exemption seems to be broader
than the Pennsylvania provision in theory; in practice, the difference is likely
to be quite minimal, perhaps even nonexistent, if the Pennsylvania administra-
tor carries out merely a pro forma review, or no review at all.
171. Official Comment to USA § 303(a), in Loss & CowTr 290. See also
Draftsmen's Commentary to USA § 303 (a), in Loss & CownTr 290-92. But
under the Pennsylvania statute, the "Commission may by order deny or re-
voke" the exemption. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-204 (Supp. 1974). Under
the proposed Ohio Securities Act, the Commissioner "may by rule modify or
further condition" the exemption. Proposed new Ohio Securities Act § 1707.-
06, S.B. 338, 110th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1973-74). These powers
can be used if there is an abuse of the exemption.
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tradition. Apparently, the Pennsylvania and proposed Ohio securi-
ties acts have recognized the flaws in the reasoning that would com-
pletely exempt or exclude securities issued in statutory mergers, con-
solidations, and certain other reorganizations from statutory coverage.
Though no disclosure is generally required by the states, these acts
now at least require that certain information be made available to
shareholders before they vote on a plan of reorganization.
The disclosure requirements of Pennsylvania and Ohio must be
based on a recognition that investors need protection in the reorgan-
ization context as well as in exchanges of cash for securities. But it
then follows that these states should enact full administrative review.
When the SEC reversed administrative practice -under rule 133
by adopting rule 145, no challenge was made to the nature of fed-
eral inquiry and review. Rule 145 requires only disclosure, -and dis-
closure ,has always been the foundation of federal securities regula-
tion. But in the Pennsylvania and proposed Ohio approaches, -the
states have, after concluding -that securities issued in these corpo-
rate reorganizations present investor concerns and should be subject
to some kind of blue sky law regulation, surrendered their traditional
role of reviewing and judging such securities. In the light of the blue
sky tradition of state paternalism, the approach taken by the Penn-
sylvania and proposed Ohio securities acts with respect to these cor-
porate reorganizations is unjustified. If disclosure can replace pater-
nalism here, it should suffice elsewhere in state securities regulation
as well.
Disclosure is, of course, not a 'bad" solution. It will assure that
the security holder's decision can be based on knowledge of the im-
portant facts, and it seems to strike a balance between the need for
additional investor protection in these reorganizations and the desire
for a blue sky procedure that is not too cumbersome. But it must
be recognized that what is 'being given up is agency review of the
quality of the security before it can be sold to the public.
V. CONCLUSION
Blue sky regulation of securities issued through corporate reor-
ganizations should require compliance with the registration -provis-
ions of -the state securities act and subject these securities to the crit-
ical, substantive review characteristic of blue sky paternalism. This
additional blue sky protection is necessary in mergers, consolidations,
and exchanges of assets for securities because these transactions pre-
sent many of the same concerns present in a distribution of securi-
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ties for cash, concerns -which have always been the proper subject
of blue sky regulation. At the federal level, -the SEC has recognized
this worrisome character of reorganization-issued securities: after a
long period of exempting these securities from federal registration
proved unsatifactory, it adopted rule 145, which required disclosure
equivalent to that exacted for those distributions typically subject to
the registration requirements.
But the change in the federal law is not a complete response to
the need for investor protection in the reorganization context. Ade-
quate investor protection during these transactions must also be as-
sured at the state level. State paternalism has traditionally sought
to guarantee a high degree of investor protection; this protection has
not -been extended to securities issued in corporate reorganizations.
The definitional exclusion and exempt transaction treatments given
these reorganization-issued securities in the majority of blue sky
jurisdictions ignore the concerns that arise from these transactions.
The disclosure approach of the Pennsylvania and proposed Ohio
securities acts is a step in the right direction, -but falls short of the
traditional substantive inquiry of blue sky regulation and the addi-
tional investor protection it can afford. Registration and critical ad-
ministrative review are necessary. Therefore, the states would do
well to reappraise their policies and procedures in this area carefully.
A change in blue sky regulation of securities issued in corporate
reorganizations seems in order.
R. BYRON WALLACE
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